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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

In re

)

)
Frederic D.Weinschenk,

Chapter 7
Case No. 02-21455 JBH

)

)
Debtor

)

___________________________________________ )

)
State of Maine,

)

Adv. Proceeding No. 04-2004

)
Plaintiff

)

)
v.

)

)
)
Frederic D. Weinschenk,

ORDER ON STATE’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)
Defendant

)

This matter came before the Court on the State’s M otion for Summary Judgment
on Count I of the State’s Complaint to determine the dischargeability of restitution and
costs imposed upon the Debtor in connection with violations of the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523a(2)( A).
The Court has considered the parties’ submissions, including the record o f the
State Court proceedings in State v. Weinschenk, CV-00-244 (Me. Super. Ct., Kenn. Cty.,
Dec. 23, 2002) (Studstrup, K.).
As agreed by the parties, the State Court’s findings will be given collateral
estoppel effect on all of the elements o f dischargeability except for intent to deceive.
Because intent to deceive was not an element of the State Court action, there is no

preclusive effect on that issue. The State’s Motion is denied. The matter for trial is
limited to the issue of the debtor’s intent to deceive. The parties will submit a revised
pretrial scheduling order.

,

January 3, 2005

/s/ James B. Haines, Jr.

Dated: _______ 3

JAMES B. HAINES, JR.
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

033635
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Decision:
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CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and LEVY, JJ.
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STATE OF MAINE
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK et al.

ALEXANDER, J.
[Tfl] Frederic D. Weinschenk and Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. (RWB)
appeal from a judgment and order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County,
Studsfrup, J.) finding that they violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA),
5 M.R.S.A. §§ 207, 209 (2002), by engaging in a pattern or practice of unfair or
deceptive acts by (1) selling defective houses that did not comply with generally
accepted construction practices, and (2) misrepresenting to consumers the quality
of the construction of the houses. Weinschenk and RWB contend that the court
erred in: (1) finding violations of the UTPA; (2) imposing injunctive relief; (3)
awarding restitution to indirect purchasers; (4) holding Weinschenk individually
liable; and (5) dismissing their counterclaim.

We affirm the finding that
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Weinschenk and RWB violated the UTPA, the imposition of injunctive relief and
the dismissal of the counterclaim. Because the court erred in awarding restitution
to indirect purchasers, we vacate and remand for correction of the judgment
regarding restitution.
I. CASE HISTORY
[Tf2] Frederic Weinschenk has been involved in the construction business
for forty years. After moving to Maine in the early 1980s, Weinschenk built what
he described as “high-end” single-family houses. In the early 1990s, Weinschenk
developed a plan to create moderately priced, compact, custom-designed single
family houses. By lowering construction costs, Weinschenk was able to build
houses costing twenty-five to thirty percent less per square foot than the “highend” houses he had previously built. Weinschenk then formed RWB. With RWB,
Weinschenk created several housing developments in the Portland area. Although
buyers contracted directly with RWB for the construction work, all of the original
buyers met individually with Weinschenk, and he personally designed the houses
in each development.
[Tf3] While some buyers were pleased with their newly constructed houses,
and nearly all were satisfied with the intricate design, buyers in three of the
developments experienced significant problems with their houses shortly after
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moving in.

Homeowners reported severe leaks from the windows and roofs,

bursting pipes, leaking toilets, and cracks in tiles and in the foundation.
[Tf4] Complaints from homeowners led the Attorney General to investigate
Weinschenk and RWB’s trade practices. Upon inspection of fifteen houses, the
State’s consulting engineer identified several common defects in the houses. He
reported that the stairs did not comply with applicable building codes, the roofs
and windows compromised the weather tightness of the houses, and overall, the
houses were “poorly built.”

The State then commenced an action against

Weinschenk and RWB pursuant to the UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.

RWB and

Weinschenk filed a counterclaim alleging that by bringing suit, the State
unilaterally abrogated a consent agreement that Weinschenk had entered into with
the Maine Oil and Solid Fuel Board.1
[|5] A non-jury trial was held in Superior Court. A number of individuals
who owned houses designed by Weinschenk and constructed by RWB testified
about problems in their houses. Several of the homeowners who testified at trial
were “indirect purchasers,” that is, they were the second or third buyers of the
homes rather than the original purchaser. The indirect purchasers did not contract1

1 The consent agreement arose out of a dispute between the Maine Oil and Solid Fuel Board and RWB.
The Oil and Solid Fuel Board ordered RWB to repair twenty-nine chimneys that allegedly violated the
fire code, in houses constructed by RWB. RWB then entered into a consent agreement with the Oil and
Solid Fuel Board to repair the chimneys and in exchange the Board agreed not to take any further action
against RWB for the chimney violations. No chimney violations are at issue in this action.
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with RWB for construction purposes, nor did they consult with Weinschenk
regarding the design of their houses.
[^[6] The Superior Court found that Weinschenk and RWB violated the
UTPA by engaging in a pattern or practice of unfair or deceptive acts by selling
houses that were defective and that did not comply with generally accepted
construction practices, and by misrepresenting to consumers the quality of the
construction of the houses.

The court ordered Weinschenk and RWB to pay

$221,256 in restitution, through the Attorney General, for the benefit of nine of the
homeowners.

Five of these homeowners were indirect purchasers, and four

purchased their homes directly from Weinschenk and RWB. The Superior Court
also issued injunctions against Weinschenk and RWB, requiring them to meet a
number of requirements before building any residential dwelling in the State. In
addition, the court dismissed the counterclaim, finding that the State had not
waived sovereign immunity.
[1[7j Weinschenk and RWB appeal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
[$8] Whether a trade practice is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact
determined by the fact-finder. Binette v. Dyer Library A ss’n, 688 A.2d 898, 906
(Me. 1996). Accordingly, we review findings of violations of the UTPA for clear
error. State v. Shattuck, 2000 ME 38, $ 13, 747 A.2d 174, 178. Findings of fact
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are clearly erroneous only when no competent evidence supporting the finding
exists in the record. Estate ofDeschenes, 2003 ME 35, t 11, 818 A.2d 1026, 1030.
[1f9] When there is a challenge to a court ordered injunction, we review the
issuance of the injunction for a sustainable exercise of the cohrt’s discretion; Bates
v. Department o f Behavioral and Developmental Services, 2004 ME 154, ^[38, 863
A.2d 890, 901; we review the factual findings underlying the exercise of that
discretion for clear error. State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 895 (Me. 1995).
ffllO] A motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint or counterclaim. New Orleans Tanker Corp. v. Dep’t o f
Transp., 1999 ME 67, t 3, 728 A.2d 673, 674-75.

We review the material

allegations of the complaint or counterclaim in the light most favorable to the party
asserting the claim to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action
or alleges facts that would entitle that party to relief pursuant to some legal theory.
Id.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

The Unfair Trade Practices Act
[^11]

Maine’s UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 205-A to 214 (2002), provides

protection for consumers against unfair and deceptive trade practices. It declares
unlawful “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” 5 M.R.S.A. § 207. In enacting the
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UTPA in 1969, the Legislature intended “to bring into Maine law the federal
interpretations of ‘unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices[,]”’ as set forth in the Federal Trade Commission Act. Bartner v. Carter,
405 A'.2d 194, 199-201 (Me. 1979); 5 M.R.S.A. § 207(1).
1.

The Attorney General’s Authority to Commence an Action Pursuant
to the UTPA

[^[12] Weinschenk and RWB contend that the Attorney General did not have
the authority to commence an action against them pursuant to the UTPA because
the claims arose out of separate, single home construction contracts. They assert
that these separate, individual transactions cannot be aggregated to create an unfair
or deceptive trade practice. Title 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 of the UTPA authorizes the
Attorney General to bring an action when there is reason to believe that a person is
using or is about to use an unfair method, act or practice, and the proceeding is in
the public interest. An unfair method, act or practice may be identified based on a
group of separate, individual business transactions that display a common pattern
of unfairness or deceit.
[1113] Because the State had evidence to support the claim that Weinschenk
and RWB were engaged in the unfair practice of designing, constructing, and
selling defective houses, and because it is in the interest of the public to prevent
builders from engaging in deceptive marketing practices and placing deficient
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houses into the stream of commerce, the Attorney General properly commenced
the action against Weinschenk and RWB pursuant to the UTPA.
[1fl4] Weinschenk and RWB also assert that the UTPA does not apply to
some transactions because industry operations are separately regulated by state or
federal law. 5 M.R.S.A. § 208(1). However, section 208(1) does not bar or limit
this action. No separately regulated transactions or actions are at issue in this case.
2.

Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices

[|15] Weinschenk and RWB contend that they did not engage in unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in violation of the UTPA. The UTPA does not contain
a definition of either the term “unfair” or “deceptive.” Shattuck, 2000 ME 38,
Tf 13, 747 A.2d at 178. Determination of whether an act or practice is “unfair or
deceptive” in violation of the UTPA must be made by the fact-finder on a case-by
case basis. Binette, 688 A.2d at 906. In determining what constitutes an unfair or
deceptive act pursuant to the UTPA, we are guided by the interpretations given by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the federal courts. 5 M.R.S.A. § 207(1);
Suminski v. Maine Appliance Warehouse, Inc., 602 A.2d 1173, 1174-75 n.l (Me.
1992).
[^[16] To justify a finding of unfairness, the act or practice: (1) must cause,
or be likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers; (2) that is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers; and (3) that is not outweighed by any countervailing
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benefits to consumers or competition. Tungate v. MacLean-Stevens Studios, Inc.,
1998 ME 162,1 9, 714 A.2d 792, 797; FTC v. Crescent Publ’g Group, Inc., 129 F.
Supp. 2d 311, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(n) (West 1997). The trial
court essentially concluded that: (1) leaking roofs and windows and a'pattem of
other substandard construction practices are serious defects; (2) Weinschenk and
RWB engaged in a pattern or practice of marketing houses with such defects,
although they “obviously know about these problems”; (3) these defects have
caused substantial injury to consumers who purchased houses designed by
Weinschenk and constructed by RWB;

(4 )

the direct owners of these houses could

not have reasonably avoided purchasing them without the defects because of
misrepresentations about the quality of construction; and (5) no countervailing
benefit to consumers or competition would result by permitting Weinschenk and
RWB to continue to market and produce houses that have serious defects.
[1(17] To determine whether Weinschenk and RWB engaged in a deceptive
act or practice, within the meaning of the UTPA, we are guided by the “clear and
understandable standard” articulated by the FTC and the federal courts. In re
Clijfdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 164 (1984). An act or practice is deceptive
if it is a material representation, omission, act or practice that is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances. Id. at 164-65; Novartis
Corp. v. FTC, 223 F.3d 783, 786 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A material representation,
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omission, act or practice “involves information that is important to consumers and,
hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product.” Cliffdale
Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. at 165. An act or practice may be deceptive, within the
meaning of Maine’s UTPA, regardless of a defendant’s good faith or lack of intent
to deceive. Binette, 688 A.2d at 906.
[^[18] The record supports the conclusion that through advertisements and
personal contacts with consumers, Weinschenk and RWB made material
representations to consumers who purchased new houses.

Because these

representations provided consumers with information that likely affected thendecision to purchase houses designed by Weinschenk and constructed by RWB,
they are material. The Superior Court properly found that Weinschenk and RWB’s
design and construction practices were unfair trade practices and that material
representations, made by Weinschenk and RWB, were deceptive acts, in violation
of the UTPA, because the representations were likely to mislead reasonable
consumers as to the quality of the houses sold.
3.

Individual Liability

[^[19] Weinschenk contends that because he did not personally make actual
misrepresentations or commit fraud, the court erred in finding that he violated the
UTPA and erred in finding him jointly and severally liable, with RWB, for the
payment of restitution and costs. The record indicates that Weinschenk engaged in
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direct personal dealings with each of the original buyers and that he personally
designed the homes found to be defective. Further, although corporations are
separate legal entities with limited liability, courts may disregard the corporate
entity, “'when used to cover fraud or illegality, or to justify a wrong.” Anderson v.
Kennebec River Pulp & Paper Co., 433 A.2d 752, 756 n.5 (Me. 1981). A court
may pierce the corporate veil if a plaintiff establishes that: “(1) the defendant
abused the privilege of a separate corporate identity; and (2) an unjust or
inequitable result would occur if the court recognized the separate corporate
existence.” Johnson v. Exclusive Properties Unlimited, 1998 ME 244, ^ 6, 720
A.2d 568, 571. See also Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers
South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1991).
[^[20] The court properly disregarded RWB as a separate legal entity and
found Weinschenk personally liable for his corporation’s actions because: (1)
Weinschenk, the principal representative of RWB, had direct, personal dealings
with each of the original purchasers and personally misrepresented the quality of
the houses; (2) RWB was thinly capitalized and insolvent at the time of trial; (3)
Weinschenk, as the only officer and director of RWB, had pervasive control over
RWB; and (4) holding only the bankrupt RWB liable would lead to an unjust and
inequitable result for the injured homeowners.
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B.

Remedies
[|21]

Weinschenk and RWB claim that the Superior Court erred in

awarding restitution to indirect purchasers and in issuing the injunctions.

The

Legislature has provided the courts with express authority to issue monetary
awards to consumers for violations of the UTPA and to issue temporary or
permanent injunctions to restrain and prevent violations. 5 M.R.S.A. §209. When
there has been a finding of an unlawful trade practice, the trial court is given
considerable discretion to fashion an equitable remedy. State v. Bob Chambers
Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362, 366 (Me. 1987).
1.

Restitution to Indirect Purchasers

[1J22] Indirect purchasers are individuals who do not deal directly with those

engaging in the unfair trade practice or activity. Rather, indirect purchasers are
injured when the “costs of illegal activities are passed down the distribution chain.”
Robert F. Roach, Revitalizing Indirect Purchaser Claims: Antitrust Enforcement
Under New York Law, 13 P a c e L. Re v . 9, 11 (1993). The United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of indirect purchaser recovery in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), and in California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S.
93 (1989).
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[^[23] In Illinois Brick Co., indirect purchasers brought an antitrust action
against manufacturers of concrete blocks.

431 U.S. at 726.

The indirect

purchasers alleged that the manufacturer had engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy.
Id. Citing a number of policy concerns, the Supreme Court held that the indirect
purchasers were not entitled to recover. Id. at 730-35. The Court reasoned that
allowing indirect purchasers to recover would: (1) “create a serious risk of multiple
liability for defendants”;23 (2) create evidentiary complexities;4 and (3) not be the
most effective method of enforcing the antitrust laws.5 Id.
[*¡24] In California v. ARC America Corp., Alabama, Arizona, California,
and Minnesota alleged that cement manufacturers had engaged in a nationwide
conspiracy to fix cement prices. 490 U.S. at 97. The states, which were indirect
purchasers of the cement, asserted that their respective state antitrust laws
permitted indirect purchasers to recover all of the overcharges passed on to them
by the direct purchasers. Id. at 98. Alabama, California, and Minnesota’s antitrust
2 The indirect purchasers of concrete blocks were the State of Illinois and various local governmental
entities. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 726 (1977).
3 The Court noted that if direct purchasers were allowed to recover for the full amount of the
overcharge, then the indirect purchasers might also be able to recover from the defendant, thus subjecting
the defendant to duplicative liability. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730.
4 The Court stated that in order to establish the amount of the overcharge, the first purchaser would have
to establish the overcharge amount at each point where the goods changed hands before they reached the
plaintiff. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732-33.
5 The Court concluded that the antitrust laws would be more effective if direct purchasers recovered the
full amount of the overcharge, rather than permitting the ultimate consumers to assert a claim only for the
amount each could establish that it had absorbed. Illinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 734-35-.
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laws expressly authorize recovery to indirect purchasers. Id. at 98 n.3. Arizona’s
antitrust statute, like Maine’s UTPA, is guided by federal law. Id. The Supreme
Court determined that although antitrust recovery is limited to direct purchasers
under federal law, indirect purchasers may recover under state antitrust laws. Id. at
101-03.
[^[25] In FTC v. Mylan Laboratories, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d. 25 (D.D.C.
1999), the District Court addressed the issue of indirect purchaser recovery under
Maine’s UTPA. In that case, the FTC and thirty-two states brought an action
against drug companies for federal and state antitrust law violations. Id. at 32.
The District Court initially found that indirect purchasers in Maine were not
entitled to recovery under the UTPA.

Id. at 48.

Upon a motion for

reconsideration, the Mylan court reinstated “Maine’s claims for restitution on
behalf of . . . indirect purchasers under the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act
(UTPA).” FTCv. Mylan Lab, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999).
[f26]

ARC and Mylan establish that indirect purchasers may recover

pursuant to Maine’s UTPA.

In addition, 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 gives the court

authority to make orders or judgments as “may be necessary to restore to any
person who has suffered any ascertainable loss by reason of the use or employment
of such unlawful method, act or practice, any moneys or property, real or personal,
which may have been acquired by means of such method, act or practice.”
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5 M.R.S.A. § 209 (emphasis added). Each claim for violation of the UTPA and
recovery of restitution must be judged on its own facts. Binette, 688 A.2d at 906.
Based on the particular facts of this case, the indirect purchasers of
Weinschenk/RWB houses are not entitled to restitution.
[^}27] There is evidence that the direct purchasers of Weinschenk/RWB
houses reasonably relied on Weinschenk and RWB’s representations to them that
their houses would be of good quality and that they sustained a substantial injury
when the houses delivered were not of the promised construction quality. There is
no evidence that the indirect purchasers relied on Weinschenk or RWB’s
misrepresentations or that the indirect purchasers sustained either a substantial
injury or an ascertainable loss as a result of Weinschenk and RWB’s
misrepresentations. Rather, indirect purchasers had the opportunity to inspect the
houses before purchasing them.

The indirect purchasers may have relied on

representations made by the original purchasers, but they did not rely on
misrepresentations made by Weinschenk or RWB.

Furthermore, while direct

purchasers may have overpaid for Weinschenk/RWB houses, because they
believed they were purchasing high quality houses free from substantial defects,
there is no evidence that the overcharge was passed on to the indirect purchasers.
The indirect purchasers may have received a discounted price as a result of the
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indicated defects. If so, they would have suffered no ascertainable loss, and a
restitution payment would be a windfall.
[f28] Only the direct purchasers, Mullen, Tufts, Thibodeau, and Novotny,
are entitled to recover restitution.
2.

Injunctions

[*¡29] Weinschenk and RWB assert that the injunctions imposed upon them
by the Superior Court, requiring them to hire a registered engineer to confirm that
their building and construction plans comply with applicable codes, and to submit
their advertising materials and building contracts to the Attorney General’s office
for review, are overbroad. In fashioning appropriate remedies for violations of the
UTPA, courts are given broad discretion “to do complete justice.” Bob Chambers
Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d at 366. An injunction issued pursuant to the UTPA is to be
remedial in nature. 5 M.R.S.A. § 209. By requiring Weinschenk and RWB to
follow a procedure that is intended to prevent them from building and marketing
defective houses, the Superior Court fashioned a remedy designed to protect future
consumers who purchase houses from Weinschenk or RWB. The Superior Court
neither erred, nor engaged in an unsustainable exercise of discretion, in issuing
injunctions against Weinschenk and RWB.
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C.

Counterclaim
fl|30] Weinschenk and RWB contend that the court erred in dismissing their

counterclaim against the State. The court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
counterclaim pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 13(d), finding "that sovereign immunity had
not been waived.

We need not address whether the Superior Court properly

concluded that the counterclaim was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
In viewing Weinschenk and RWB’s counterclaim in the light most favorable to
them, we conclude that it does not set forth elements of a cause of action, nor does
it allege facts that would, entitle them to relief pursuant to some legal theory.
Pursuant to the consent agreement with the Maine Oil and Solid Fuel Board, RWB
agreed to replace defective chimneys they had installed. In exchange the State
agreed not to take further action against RWB for installing defective chimneys.
Because the defective chimneys were not at issue here, the State has not breached
the consent agreement by bringing an action against Weinschenk and RWB for
violation of the UTPA.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated with respect to the court’s
restitution award to the indirect purchasers.
Remanded for recalculation of the restitution only
to direct purchasers. The judgment is affirmed in
all other respects.
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LEVY, J., with whom CALKINS, J., joins, concurring in part, and dissenting in
part.
[|3 1] I join the Court’s opinion except for the portion that vacates the award
of restitution to the indirect purchasers.
[Tf32] The sole reason asserted by Weinschenk and RWB on appeal for
setting aside the trial court’s award of restitution to the indirect purchasers is their
argument that restitution can be awarded only for consumers from whom
Weinschenk and RWB directly acquired money or property as a result of an unfair
or deceptive trade practice.

The Court properly rejects this argument, citing

California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97 (1989); and FTC v. Mylan
Laboratories, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1999). Nonetheless, the Court
vacates the restitution awarded to the indirect purchasers, relying on reasons not
raised before the trial court and not addressed in the parties’ briefs.
[|33]

The trial court based its restitution award for both the direct and

indirect purchasers on competent evidence of the estimated cost of replacing the
defective roofs and windows, and of other specific repairs at the homes of the
direct and indirect purchasers.

In its written decision, the trial court carefully

evaluated the conflicting expert testimony regarding the cost of repairing the
defects in each home. The Court concludes, however, that there was no evidence
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“that the indirect purchasers sustained either a substantial injury or ascertainable
loss,” and that they “may have received a discounted price as a result of the
indicated defects.”
[TJ34]

Neither of the Court’s conclusions are compelled by the record

evidence in this case.

The Court should instead defer to the trial court’s

assessment of the significance of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be
drawn. See Stickney v. City o f Saco, 2001 ME 69, f 13, 770 A.2d 592, 600.
[f35]

Of even greater concern is the Court’s assignment of error to the

absence of “evidence that the indirect purchasers relied on Weinschenk or RWB’s
misrepresentations.” The Court does not cite a single authority to support this
newly announced construction of 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 (2002) requiring proof of
actual reliance by indirect purchasers.

We should refrain from substantially

reducing the availability of UTPA remedies for consumers without the benefit of a
thorough analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and its policy objectives.
|j[36] I would affirm the judgment in all respects.
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE
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In re:
Frederic D. Weinschenk, d/b/a
Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.
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* Case No. 02-21455
*
*
*

Debtor

State of Maine Attorney General

*

*
*
*
*
*

Plaintiff

Adv No. 04-2004

*
*
*

vs.

*
*

Frederic D. Weinschenk d/b/a
Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.

*
*
*

Defendant

*

*******************************************

JUDGMENT

For the reasons set forth on the record at the close o f trial conducted on M arch 4,2005, it
is hereby ORDERED that judgm ent shall be entered in favor o f the plaintiff and against the
defendant. The claim that is the subject o f the p la in tiffs adversary complaint is
nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

March 4, 2005
DATED________________

Is/ James B. Haines, Jr.
James B. Haines, Jr.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
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)

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
Y.

FREDERIC WEINSCHENK, et al.,
Defendants

AFFIDAVIT CONCERNING
ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

I, Linda Conti, being duly sworn, do depose and state:
1.

I have been engaged in the practice of law since 1987.

2.

I am presently employed by the State of Maine as an Assistant

Attorney General, a position I have held since May, 1988.
3.

In this matter I represent the State of Maine. Pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A.

§ 1522, this Affidavit is submitted in support of the State’s Request for costs,
including reasonable attorney’s fees and expert witness fees.
4.

Computation of my time spent working on this matter is based upon

my contemporaneous records and is as follows:
DATE

TIME (hours)

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

September 2, 1998

1.5

Meeting with Alan Mooney and Al
Hodsdon to discuss inspection reports
and additional inspections to be done

October 2, 1998

1.5

Interviewed Kenneth and Mary Lou
LeMoult

October 2, 1998

1

Interviewed Stanley Reichenberg and
Liz Scott Graham

October 5, 1998

2

Interviewed Claire and Russell Ross

DATE
October 5, 1998

TIME (hours)

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

1.5

Interviewed Robert and Althea
Strauss

October 23, 1998

1.5

Interviewed Sabine McElrath

November 23, 1998

.25

Telephone conference with John
Mullen

November 23, 1998

.25

Telephone conference with Al
Hodsdon

December 29, 1998

1

February 11,1999

Reviewed Mooney draft report for
Robbins, O’Grady, Tufts and Brigham
homes
Telephone conference with Katherin
O’Grady

.25

April 16, 1999

1

Reviewed draft Mooney Report

May3, 1999

1

Drafted Complaint

May 5, 1999

1

Worked on Complaint and case memo
which is litigation proposal plan

May 6, 1999

1.5

Reviewed corporate documents for
Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and
Cottage Designs LLC from Secretary
of State’s Office and edited Complaint

May 12, 1999

Drafted case memo

A

I

May 17, 1999

1.5

Conference with Alan Mooney; edited
case memo

June 1, 1999

2

Drafted case memo/ litigation plan

June 3, 1999

6

Drafted case memo/ litigation plan

June 11, 1999

3

Researched warranty theories and
drafted memo
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DATE

TIME (hours)

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

November 3, 1999

2

Meeting with Frederic Weinschenk,
David Hirshon and Al Hutcheon

November5, 1999

.5

Reviewed initial Hutcheon report

November 10, 1999

1

Conference with Mooney re: initial
Hutcheon report

December 18, 2000

2

January 26, 2001

1

Researched and drafted Motion to
Strike Jury Demand

March 30, 2001

1

Researched and drafted State’s
Memo in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Report

June 11,2001

3

Prepared responses to Defendants’
Request for Documents and
Interrogatories and Privilege Log

August 9, 2001

3

Deposition of Frederic Weinschenk

October 1, 2001

1.5

October 1, 2001

1

Deposition of Richard Wortley

November 12, 2001

3.5

Deposition of Denise Novotny

November 12, 2001

1.5

Deposition of Laura Thibodeau

November 13, 2001

2.5

Deposition of David Addison

November 28, 2001

2

Deposition of Sabine McEIrath

November 30, 2001

.5

Deposition of Aaron Tufts

November 30, 2001

1

Deposition of Nancy Tufts

November 30, 2001

1.5

December 7, 2001

2

Researched and drafted Motion to
Dismiss Counterclaim

•

Deposition of Jack Nichols

Deposition of Steve Coutreau
Deposition of Katherin O’Grady
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DATE

TIME (hours)

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

December 10, 2001

2

Deposition of John Mulien

December 13, 2001

1

Deposition of Carol Hutchins

December 19, 2001

1

Responded to Defendants’ Request
for Admissions

December 21, 2001

2.5

Deposition of Steve Maclsaac

December 27, 2001

1.5

Deposition of Beverle Buell

January 10, 2002

1

Deposition of John Haley

January 11,2002

2

Researched and drafted opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment

2.00

Meeting with Carolyn Silsby to discuss
time table for trial preparation

7/16/02

July 22, 2002

.5

Drafted settlement offer

July 29, 2002

.25

Telephone conference with Carol
Hutchins

July 30, 2002

1

Researched and drafted Trial Brief

July 31,2002

.5

Research for Trial Brief

July 31, 2002

.25

Conference with Alan Mooney

July 31,2002

2.5

Meeting with Kate Silsby, Betsy
Andrews, and Angela Blais re: Trial
preparation

August 1, 2002

2

Selected exhibits and prepared exhibit
list

August 9, 2002

.25

August 9, 2002

1

Additional research for trial brief

August 10, 2002

2

Redrafted trial brief

Telephone conference with Laura
Thibodeau
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DATE

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

TIME (hours)

August 28, 2002

2

Meeting with Caroiyn Siisby to discuss
trial preparation

September 5, 2002

3

Expert meeting with Alan Mooney

September 6, 2002

.75

Meeting with Carolyn Siisby re: direct
examination of consumers

September 6, 2002

.5

Telephone conferences with Alan
Mooney, Steve Coutreau and Steve
Maclsaac

September 8, 2002

1

Telephone conferences with Ken
LeMoult, Nancy Tufts, David Addison
and Claire Ross; Drafted Motion in
Limine

September 9, 2002

2

Responded to Defendants’ Motion for
Stay of Trial due to pending
bankruptcy; consulted with Assistant
Attorney General Liz Wyman on
bankruptcy law; conference call with
court on Defendants’ Motion; Phone
call with David Hirshon re: settlement

September 11, 2002

9

Trial and trial preparation

September 12, 2002

9

Trial and trial preparation

September 13, 2002

1

Reviewed Hutcheon’s Supplemental
report; faxed report to Alan Mooney;
phone call with Alan Mooney

September 15, 2002

1

Conference with Mooney re: direct
examination

September 17, 2002

9

Trial

September 18, 2002

9

Trial

September 19, 2002

8

Trial

September 20, 2002

4

Trial, reviewed and redacted expert
reports
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DATE

TIME (hours)

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

September 23, 2002

1

Meeting with Carolyn Silsby re: Post
trial brief

September 23, 2002

3

Drafted Post Trial Brief

September 25, 2002

3

Additional research on individual
liability; edited Trial Brief

October 30, 2002

2.50

January 14, 2003

2

Attendance at trial for Stephen
Coutreau’s testimony
Researched and drafted Memo in
Opposition to Defendants’ Post Trial
Motions

February 4, 2003

.5

Argument on Post Trial Motions

February 4, 2003

1

Prepared Attorney’s Fees Affidavit

February 13, 2003

.5

Reviewed and finalized Attorney’s
Fees Affidavit

Total Hours: 155.25

Other costs incurred in this action are as follows:
DATE

AMOUNT PAID

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

August 14, 1998

$3,267.35

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
July 1, 1998 to July 31, 1998

September 18, 1998

$1,142.42

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
August 1, 1998 to August 31, 1998

October 6, 1998

$1,273.00

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
September 1, 1998 to September 30,
1998
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DATE
November 13, 1998

December 11,1998

January 14, 1999

April 20, 1999

AMOUNT PAID

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

$262.53 Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
October 1, 1998 to October 31, 1998
$1622.98

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
November 1, 1998 to November 30,
1998

$860.39

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
December 1, 1998 to December 31,
1998

$10,361.59 Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
March 1, 1999 to March 31, 1999

July 14, 1999

$2,405.58

July 14, 1999

$757.18

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
April 1, 1999 to April 30, 1999
Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
September 1, 1999 to September 30,
1999

March 2, 200Q

$95.00

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
December 1, 1999 to December 31,
1999

March 2, 2000

$477.50

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
January 1, 1999 to January 31, 1999

March 2, 2000

$768.00

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
February 1, 1999 to February 28, 1999

$1,096.58

Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
February 1,2000 to February 29, 2000

March 15, 2000
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DATE

AMOUNT PAID

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

April 11, 2001

$1,728.08

May 15, 2001

$98.00

City of Portland for copies of
documents

October 2, 2001

$94.75

Boyce and Leighton for a copy of the
transcript of the deposition of Jack
Nichols

October 2, 2001

$279.20

Pieske Reporting Service for
attendance at the deposition of and
original and copy of the deposition
transcript

October 26, 2001

$114.81

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
August 1, 2001 to August 31, 2001

October 26, 2001

$294.40

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
July 1, 2001 to July 31,2001

October 26, 2001

$718.50

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
June 1, 2001 to June 30, 2001

October 26, 2001

$80.36

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
May 1, 2001 to May 31, 2001

October 26, 2001

$3,006.93

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
April 1, 2001 to April 30, 2001

October 29, 2001

$148.35

December 17, 2001

Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
March 1,2001 to March 31, 2001

$1,324.37
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Pieske Reporting Service for
attendance at the deposition and
transcript of the deposition of Richard
Wortley
Critérium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
November 1, 2001 to November 30,
2001

DATE

AMOUNT PAID DESCRIPTION OF WORK

January 11, 2002

$157.00 Boyce and Leighton for a copy of the
deposition transcript of Stephen
Maclsaac

January 11, 2002

$311.10 Boyce and Leighton for the deposition
transcripts of Sabine McElrath,
Catherine 0 :Grady and Carol Hutchins

January 15, 2002

$500.00 Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
December 1, 2001 to December 31,
2001

January 22, 2002

$292.50 Boyce and Leighton for a copy of the
transcripts of the depositions of
Stephen Coutreau, Nancy Tufts and
Aaron Tufts

January 24, 2002

$131.25

February 4, 2002

$87.50

Boyce and Leighton for a copy of the
transcript of the deposition of David
Addison
Boyce and Leighton for the transcript of
the deposition for John Haley

February 13, 2002

$412.50 Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
January 1, 2002 to January 31, 2002

February 21, 2002

$106.75 Boyce and Leighton for a copy of the
deposition transcript of Beverle Buell

February 25, 2002

$304.50

Boyce and Leighton for copy of the
transcript of the depositions of Denise
Novotny and Laura Thibodeau

May 10, 2002

$118.90

Downing and Peters Reporting
Associates for a copy of the transcript
of the deposition of John R. Mullen

August 9, 2002

$46.48 John Mullen for witness fee and
mileage

August 9, 2002

$46.48
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Nancy Tufts for witness fee and
mileage

DATE

AMOUNT PAID

DESCRIPTION OF WORK

August 9, 2002

$46.48

Claire Ross for witness fee and
mileage

August 9, 2002

$46.48

Laura Thibodeau for witness fee and
mileage

August 9, 2002

$46.48

Denise Novotny for witness fee and
mileage

August 26, 2002

$46.48

Beverle Buell for witness fee and
mileage

August 26, 2002

$46.48

Kathi O'Grady for witness fee and
mileage

August 26, 2002

$46.48

Carol Hutchins for witness fee and
mileage

August 26, 2002

$46.48

David Addison for witness fee and
mileage

September 10, 2002

$46.48

Stephen Monn

September 11,2002

$75.00

Filing fee in Bankruptcy Court on
Motion for Relief from Stay

September 11,2002

$580.00

September 18, 2002

$32.00

October 8, 2002

October 29, 2002

$11,192.51

$36.50
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Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
August 1, 2002 to August 31, 2002
Culver and Dimarco Associates, Inc. for
the transcript of the telephonic
deposition of Richard Hauser
Criterium Mooney Engineers for
professional services rendered from
September 1, 2002 to September 30,
2002
Paid to Case L. Enoch for a copy of the
transcripts of the testimony of Stephen
Coutreau and Denise Novotny

AMOUNT PAID

^dateT

November 20, 2002

$3,342.50

DESCRIPTION OF WORK
Critérium Mooney Engineers for
attendance at trial of Peter Gordon and
Alan Mooney

Total Paid: $50,423,26
As an attorney with 15 years of experience, and based on the hourly rates
reviewed by the Law Court in S tate o f M aine v. P atten Corp. et al., 617 A.2d 210
(Me. 1992), fees paid to such organizations as Pine Tree Legal Assistance and the
fees paid to private sector attorneys, $125 an hour is a reasonable hourly rate for
an attorney with my experience. Accordingly, total costs of $69,829.51, including
attorney's fees in the amount of $19,406.25, expert witness fees in the amount of
$47,685.16 and other expenses of $2,738.10 are appropriate.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 18, 2003
LINDA J.
Maine Be
Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division
Office of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
th.
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. 99-

STATE OF MAINE

)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.

)

FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I. INTRODUCTION
1.

The State brings this action against Frederic D. Weinschenk, Ric

Weinschenk Builders, Inc., and Cottage Park, Inc. pursuant to the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act (“UTPA”), 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-216 seeking permanent injunctive relief,
restitution, civil penalties, costs and attorney’s fees.

II. PARTIES
2.

Plaintiff, State of Maine, is a sovereign state and brings this action by and

through its Attorney General pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.§§ 191 and 209 and the powers
vested in him by common law.
3.

Defendant Frederic D. Weinschenk (“Weinschenk”) is and was at all

material times a general contractor, designer, builder, and seller of residential dwellings,
with a place of business in Portland, Maine. He currently has a business and residence at
91 Summer Place, Portland, Maine.
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4.

Defendant Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. (“RW B”) is a corporation

organized in 1989 and existing under the laws of the State of M aine with its principal
place of business at 91 Summer Place, Portland, Maine. RWB is engaged in business as
a general contractor and builder of residential homes.
5.

Defendant Frederic D. Weinschenk is the President, Treasurer and director

of RWB and its alter ego.
6.

Defendant Cottage Park, Inc. (“Cottage Park”) is a corporation organized

in 1993 and existing under the laws of the State of Maine with is its principal place of
business at 91 Summer Place, Portland, Maine. Cottage Park is engaged in the business
of real estate sales and development.
7.

Defendant Frederic D. Weinschenk is the President, Treasurer and director

of Cottage Park and its alter ego.
III. JU R ISD IC TIO N AND VENUE
8.

This court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 105

and 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
9.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, venue is proper in Kennebec County.
IV. STA TU TO RY BACKGROUND

10.

Under the UTPA, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, unfair or deceptive acts or practices

in the conduct of any trade or business are unlawful.
11.

Pursuant to the Home Construction Contract Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1486-

1490, for home construction contracts over $1400 there must be a written contract that
includes among other provisions certain statutory warranty and dispute resolution
information. Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1487(7) the contractor must warrant that the

2

work will be free from faulty materials; constructed according to the applicable building
codes; constructed in a skillful manner and fit for habitation or appropriate use. In
addition 10 M.R.S.A. § 1487(7) provides that the warranty rights and remedies set forth
in the Maine Uniform Commercial Code apply to the contract. A violation of the Home
Construction Contract Act constitutes a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.

V. FACTS
12.

Prior to 1993, Defendants Weinschenk and RWB designed, built,

advertised for sale and sold residential homes.
13.

Beginning in 1993 Defendants Weinschenk, RWB and Cottage Park

designed, built and marketed homes in Cottage Park, a development in Portland, Maine.
14.

As the homes in Cottage Park were nearing completion, Defendants began

a second development in Portland, Maine known as Summer Place.
15.

When selling homes, Defendants entered into contracts with buyers. The

contracts did not include warranty and dispute resolution information.

A. Material Variance from Specifications
16.

In designing homes, Defendants provided construction specifications to

customers for each home to be built. The houses they built did not comply with the stated
specifications in material respects, including the following:
(a)

the homes were not built to applicable building codes;

(b)

quality lumber was not used in the framing of the homes;

(c)

the homes do not have sufficient heating system capacity;

(d)

the fixed windows (which do not open) do not match the quality of the

operable windows (which can open and close); and
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(e)

the stair treads, risers and subfloors are not glued to the framing or joists.

B. Building Code Violations
17.

The houses that Defendants built deviate from applicable building codes in

several respects including:
(a)

inadequate emergency egress windows;

(b)

inadequate or inappropriate sized hallways, stair winders, risers and

handrails;
(c)

lack of adequate footings;

(d)

lack of fire stopping;

(e)

use of inadequate wallboard in showers;

(f)

floor joists inadequate to sustain loads and resist deflection;

(g)

recessed lighting buried in insulation;

(h)

inadequate framing and nailing; and

(i)

inadequate chimneys.

C. Material Variance from Accepted Construction Practices.
18.

Defendants marketed the houses in Cottage Park and Summer Place, all of

which are approximately three to six years old, as “custom” homes.
19.

Custom homes are usually

(a)

built from designer plans;

(b)

constructed with materials and workmanship that are generally above

average; and

(c)

constructed so that they exceed building code requirements.

20.

The homes in Cottage Park and Summer Place are in fact below average

and poorly constructed. These homes do not comply with generally accepted construction
practices in many respects, including:
(a)

the framing of the homes is characterized by poor quality construction

particularly in the floors, roofs and stairs;
(b)

the chimney enclosures are poorly constructed;

(c)

the glass doors in the fireplaces are susceptible to explosion;

(d)

isolated footings provide inadequate support to significant portions of the

(e)

access roads in the Cottage Park and Summer Place developments are

houses;

poorly constructed;
(f)

inadequate lumber sizing is used for long floor spans;

(g)

space planning within the footprint of the houses is poorly conceived;

(h)

metal roofing on the homes in the Summer Place development is poorly

installed.
21.

A s a result of these code violations and substandard construction practices

the homes in Cottage Park and Summer Place show signs of structural distress such as
significant settling, cracks in finished surfaces, and significant leakage.
22.

Consumers who purchased homes from W einschenk have requested that

he make needed repairs. Weinschenk either fails to respond to such requests, or fails to
adequately make needed repairs.
23.

Some persons who purchased homes from Weinschenk sold them within a

year to secondhand purchasers.
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24.

These secondhand purchasers contacted Weinschenk to make needed

repairs. Weinschenk either fails to respond to such requests, or fails to adequately make
needed repairs.
COUNT I
(UTPA - Sale of houses that do not comply with applicable codes)
25.

Paragraphs 1 through 24 are here repeated and realleged.

26.

Defendants Weinschenk, RWB and Cottage Park have engaged in a

pattern or practice of unfair and deceptive acts or practices by selling houses that do not
comply with applicable building codes.
27.

Defendants’ conduct as described herein is intentional.
COUNT II

(UTPA - Selling houses that are defective and do not comply with accepted construction
practices)
28.

Paragraphs 1 through 27 are here repeated and realleged.

29.

Defendants’ Weinschenk, RWB and Cottage Park have engaged in a

pattern or practice of unfair and deceptive acts or practices by selling houses that are
defective and that do not comply with generally accepted construction practices.
30

Defendants’ conduct as described herein is intentional.
COUNT III
(UTPA - Misrepresentations)

31.

Paragraphs 1 through 30 above are here repeated and realleged.

32.

Defendants Weinschenk, RWB and Cottage Park have engaged in unfair

and deceptive acts or practices in connection with their construction and real estate
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development business by misrepresenting to consumers the quality of the constmction of
the homes they build and sell.
33.

Defendants’ conduct as described herein is intentional.

COUNT IV
(UTPA - Express and implied warranties)
34.

Paragraphs 1 through 33 above are here repeated and realleged.

35.

Defendants Weinschenk, RWB and Cottage Park have engaged in a

pattern and practice of not honoring express or implied warranties applicable to the
homes that they build and sell to first and secondhand purchasers in violation of 10
M.R.S.A. § 1487(7), 11 M.R.S.A. §§ 2-314 and 2-315 and 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
36.

Defendants’ conduct as described herein is intentional.

COUNTY
(UTPA - Home Constmction Contract Act)
37.

Paragraphs 1 through 36 above are here repeated and realleged.

38.

Defendants have violated the Home Constmction Contract Act by failing

to enter into written contracts with consumers who buy houses from them that include the
information required by 10 M.R.S.A. § 1487(7).
39.

Pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1490, violations o f the Home Constmction

Contract Act constitute violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.

RELIEF REQUESTED
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the following relief:
1.

Declare that Defendants Frederic D. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk

Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. have violated the UTPA by selling houses that do
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not comply with building codes or accepted construction practices, making deceptive
misrepresentations to consumers in connection with the sale of houses, engaging in a
pattern and practice of not honoring express and implied warranties applicable to the
houses, and violating the Home Construction Contract Act.
2.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 and M.R. Civ. P. 65, permanently enjoin

Defendants, their agents, servants, employees and those persons in active concert or
participation with them who receive actual notice of the injunction from:
(a)

Building and selling homes that do not comply with the Defendants’

construction specifications, applicable building codes, and generally accepted
construction practices;
(b)

Misrepresenting to consumers the quality of the homes they build and sell;

(c)

Failing to honor warranties applicable to the homes they build and sell;

(d)

Entering into written agreements to construct homes that do not comply

and

with the Home Construction Contract Act, 10 M.R.S.A. §§ 1486-1490.
3.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.§ 209 order the defendants Frederic D.

Weinschenk, Ric W einschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. to provide equitable
remedies, including restitution, rescission or repair, sufficient to make whole all
consumers injured by their unlawful practices.
4.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209 order Defendants Frederic D. Weinschenk,

Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. to pay a civil penalty of $10,000
per violation for each intentional violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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5.

Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A.§ 209, order Defendants to pay the Attorney

General its costs of suit and investigation, including attorney’s fees.
6.

Order such other and further relief as the Court may deem necessary to

remedy the effects of Defendants’ unfair and deceptive business practices.

Dated: October 7, 1999
ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
Tel. (207) 626-8800
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TOLLING AGREEMENT
This Tolling Agreement is entered into th is _______ day of January, 2000 by and
between the State of Maine through its Attorney General (the “Attorney General”) and
Frederic D. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc.,
collectively referred to as the “parties”.
Whereas, the Attorney General, pursuant to the consumer protection laws of Maine,
is in the process of analyzing claims potentially arising out of the sale of residential
dwellings in two developments known as Cottage Park and Summer Place to Maine
residents;
Whereas, the investigation being undertaken by the Attorney General may result in
the filing of a lawsuit against Mr. Weinschenk, Ric W einschenk Builders, Inc. and/or
Cottage Park, Inc.;
Whereas, in order to facilitate an orderly, considered, and efficient analysis of all
potential claims available to the Attorney General and to allow the Attorney General and
Mr. Weinschenk, Ric W einschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. the opportunity to
negotiate a settlement without first engaging in litigation, Mr. Weinschenk, Ric
Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. are willing to enter an agreement
whereby all applicable statutes of limitations shall be tolled and all statutory and legal
rights of action arising out of or relating to their sale of residential housing existing as of
this date, whether in equity or common law, are preserved until termination of this
agreement; and
Whereas, also in order to facilitate an orderly, considered, and efficient analysis of
all potential claims available to the Attorney General and to allow the Attorney General

and Mr. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. the
opportunity to negotiate a settlement without first engaging in litigation, the Attorney
General is willing to forbear from engaging in litigation against Mr. Weinschenk, Ric
Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. arising out of the sale o f residential
dwellings in Cottage Park and Summer Place until termination of this agreement.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and of the parties mutual
forbearance and other promises and conditions contained herein, the parties, by their
undersigned attorneys, agree as follows:
1.

Commencing as of the date hereof, and continuing until termination of this

agreement pursuant to Clause 3 below, Mr. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.
and Cottage Park, Inc. agree that all time limits and all time related defenses, either in law
or in equity, including, but not limited to, statutes of limitations or the doctrine of laches,
are tolled with respect to any claims or potential claims which may be brought by the
Attorney General arising out of or relating to the sale o f residential dwellings in Cottage
Park and Summer Place.
2.

As of the date hereof, and continuing until termination of this agreement

pursuant to Clause 3 below, the Attorney General agrees not to commence litigation or
bring suit in any court or other tribunal against Mr. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders,
Inc. or Cottage Park, Inc. with respect to any claims or potential claims arising out of or
relating to the sale of residential dwellings in Cottage Park or Summer Place.
3.

This agreement will terminate on March 31, 2000, unless extended by

mutual agreement of the parties, or unless terminated earlier by any party, with respect to
that party, at any time upon providing the other parties with fifteen (15) days prior written
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notice of an intention to terminate. The Notice of Termination shall be served by the
initiating party on other parties and their attorneys by facsimile and U.S. mail.
4.

The parties agree and acknowledge that entry into this agreement by the

Attorney General does not in any way limit the ability or rights of the Attorney General to
assert in any suit or claim brought by the Attorney General against Mr. Weinschenk, Ric
Weinschenk Builders, Inc. or Cottage Park, Inc. that the Doctrine of Fraudulent
Concealment, or any other doctrine or statute, applies to toll the running of any statute of
limitations and respect o f any cause of action arising out of or relating to the sale of
residential dwellings in Cottage Park and Summer Place.
5.

It is agreed and acknowledged by the parties that by entering into this

agreement Mr. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. do not
admit to the existence and/or validity of any claims or cause of action arising out of or
relating to the sale of residential dwellings in Cottage Park and Summer Place that may be
brought by the Attorney General or any other person or entity and that, excepting the effect
of the tolling of time-related defenses pursuant to Clause 1 of this agreement, all defenses
and objections available to Mr. Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage
Park, Inc., including any time-related defenses that were available prior to the date hereof,
are preserved.
6.

This agreement constitutes the full and complete understanding regarding

the bringing of claims and the tolling of time limits and time-related defenses between the
parties. No additional promises, agreements or conditions have been entered into beyond
those set forth in this agreement.
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7.

This agreement shall not be amended except by a writing signed by all

parties hereto. This agreement may be executed by facsimile in one or more counterparts,
each of which shall be deemed an original, which together will constitute one and the same
instrument.

Dated:

/ - // -

Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Attorney for State of Maine

Dated: J - -y _
DAVID M. HIRSHON, ESQ.
Tompkins, Clough, Hirshon & Langer, PA
3 Canal Plaza
P.O. Box 15060
Portland, Maine 04112-5060
Attorney for Ric Weinschenk, Ric
Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park,
Inc.
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE,

)

)
Plaintiff
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNTERCLAIM

)
Defendants

)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, State of Maine (hereinafter “State”), brought this action against Defendants
Frederic Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. on November 20,
2000 alleging that the Defendants engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in connection
with Mr. Weinschenk's home construction business. The Defendants answered the Complaint
and Defendant Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc., (hereinafter "RWB") also asserted a
counterclaim against the State for breach of contract in connection with an action taken
against RWB in 1997 by the Maine State Oil and Solid Fuel Board (hereinafter the "Board").
The State submits this Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss the
counterclaim for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to M.R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

FACTS
A.

T he Counterclaim

The Defendant’s counterclaim alleges that RWB entered into a Consent Agreement
with the State pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 8003(5)(B) and 32 M.R.S.A. § 2315 acting through
the Maine State Oil and Solid Fuel Board, a State agency, in 1997. Counterclaim <J I2 and 8.
RWB further alleges that the State unilaterally abrogated the Consent Agreement in October
1997. Counterclaim ^[10. RWB seeks damages in amounts to be shown at trial, including
without limitation attorney’s fees and costs as a result of the breach of contract. Counterclaim

HI.
B.

The M aine State B oard of Oil an d Solid Fuel

The Maine State Board of Oil and Solid Fuel is an agency of the State of M aine
established by the legislature to regulate safety of oil burners, chimneys and fireplace
installations. 32 M.R.S.A. §§2311 through 2406. The Board has the statutory authority to
issue licenses, to investigate complaints, to promulgate rules and to hold administrative
hearings to determine whether violations of the Board's statutes and rules have been
committed. See 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 2311 through 2411.
C.

C onsent Agreements

In addition to the Board's governing law found in Title 3 2 ,1 0 M.R.S.A. § 8003
confers additional authority on licensing boards which authorizes boards to issue licenses, and
upon finding violations of applicable laws, rules or conditions of licensure to issue warnings,
censures or reprimands to a licensee, to suspend a license or registration for up to ninety (90)
days for each violation, to impose civil penalties of up to $1,500 for each violation of
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applicable laws and to impose conditions of probation upon a licensee. 10 M.R.S.A. §
8003(5)(A-1).
Licensing boards may also, pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 8003(5)(B):
“execute a consent agreement that resolves a complaint or
investigation without further proceedings. Consent agreements may be
entered into only with the consent of: the applicant, licensee or
registrant; the bureau, office, board or commission, and the
Department of the Attorney General. Any remedy, penalty or fine that
is otherwise available by law, even if only in the jurisdiction under the
Administrative Court, may be achieved by consent agreement,
including long-term suspension and permanent revocation of a
professional or occupational license or registration. A consent
agreement is not subject to review or appeal, and may be modified
only by a writing executed by all parties to the original consent
agreement. A consent agreement is enforceable by an action in
Superior Court.”

ARGUMENT
A.

Standard for Dismissal under M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Dismissal of a Complaint is proper when the Complaint fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. See M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A motion to dismiss tests the legal
sufficiency of the complaint.” Livonia v. Town of Rome, 1998 ME 39, f5 , 707 A.2d 85
(citation omitted). For the purposes of a motion made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “the material
allegations of the complaint must be taken as admitted.” Livonia, 1998 ME 39, ‘flS, 707 A.2d
at 85 (citing Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc., 486 A.2d 97, 98 (Me. 1984)).

B.

RWB Fails to State a Claim

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take well pleaded
facts as true, but need not credit bald assertions or legal conclusions. Glassman v.
Computervision Corporation. 90 F.3d 617, 628 (1st. Cir 1996)(citations omitted).
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A complaint must contain factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting
each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.
Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corn.. 851 F.2d 513, 515 (1st Cir. 1988); Robinson v. Washington
County, 529 A.2d 1357 (Me. 1987). RWB's counterclaim alleges in a conclusory fashion that
the Board unilaterally abrogated a consent agreement and that as a result of the deliberate
breach RWB seeks monetary damages to be shown at trial. Counterclaim fff 10 and 11. The
counterclaim does not set forth any facts from which one can infer the elements necessary to
sustain recovery for deliberate breach of contract. RWB does not allege what the Board did
that could constitute a deliberate breach of contract which would entitle RWB to claim
damages. Because the counterclaim does not allege facts which could entitle RWB to relief, it
must be dismissed.
Moreover, the conclusory nature of the pleading makes it unclear whether RWB's
claim sounds in contract or tort claim. There are several types of immunity that the State may
raise when sued for damages. In this case it is impossible from the face of the counterclaim to
determine which immunity applies. For this reason the counterclaim should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim. In the alternative, the counterclaim is barred by sovereign immunity as
set forth below.

C.

RWB's Counterclaim is Barred by Sovereign Immunity

A claim against the State will be dismissed "unless the State, acting through the
Legislature, has given its consent that the present action be brought against it." Drake v.
Smith. 390 A.2d 541, 543-544 (Me. 1978). Legislative waiver of the sovereign's immunity
from suit may not be inferred from a general scheme contemplating that the State will become
a party to particular kinds of contracts. Drake v. Smith, 390 A.2d 545.
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The law court has found a legislative consent to suit for breach of contract when
legislation has provided that a state agency could "sue and be sued in its own name ...and
plead and be impleaded." Waterville Industries. Inc, v. Finance Authority of Maine. 2000 ME
138 H 8,9, 758 A.2d 986. No such language is found in this case.
Title 10 § 8003(5)(B), which authorizes the Board to resolve violations by consent
decree, does not provide for consent to suits against the Board for monetary damages. Section
8003(5)(B) provides that a consent agreement can be enforced in Superior Court. By enacting
a statutory scheme that allows occupational licensing boards to resolve complaints by consent
decree, the legislature did not subject the state to civil liability on suits brought by disgruntled
licensees. The language of 10 M.R.S.A. § 8003 provides that a consent agreement can be
enforced or modified. It is a consensual resolution of a disciplinary action against RWB,
which does not give RWB contractual rights against the State.

D.

Maine Tort Claims Act

It is impossible to discern from the counterclaim what acts the State has allegedly
committed. To the extent that the claim of "deliberate breach" sounds in tort, RWB's claim is
barred by the Maine Tort Claims Act. First, RWB did not file a notice of claim and has not
shown good cause for that failure. Smith v. Voisine, 650 A.2d 1350 (Me. 1994). RWB's
failure to file a notice is fatal to its claim.
Second, RWB's claim is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims.
14 M.R.S.A. § 8110. The counterclaim alleges that the breach occurred in October of 1997.
The counterclaim was not filed until November 29, 2000. Therefore even if a deliberate
breach sounds in tort, the claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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E.

Common Law Immunity

In addition to immunity from torts provided by the Maine Tort Claims Act, 14
M.R.S.A. §§8101 through 8118, certain state agents are further protected by common law
immunities. See e.g., Ingraham v. University of Maine, 441 A.2d 691, 691 (Me.
1982)(prosecutorial immunity); Richards v. Ellis, 233 A.2d 37, 37 (Me. 1967) (judicial
immunity extended to licensing board).
The Board has statutory authority to investigate complaints and to hold hearings, to
find violations of law and to issue orders imposing disciplinary action. The Board was acting
pursuant to this authority with respect to the consent agreement in this case and therefore,
RWB's claims are barred by prosecutorial and/or judicial immunity.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the State of Maine requests that Ric Weinschenk
Builders, Inc.’s counterclaim be dismissed pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

Dated: December 18, 2000

Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE,

)
Plaintiff
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

REQUEST FOR HEARING ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
DISMISS DEFENDANT’S
COUNTERCLAIM

)
Defendants

We request the Clerk to schedule the pending Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s
Counterclaim on the next available date.
The matter to be heard is
(

) Testimonial

( X ) Non-Testimonial

To the nearest one-quarter hour, my good faith estimate of the time, which the
hearing will take, is 30 minutes.

Dated: December 18, 2000
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Telephone: (207) 626-8800

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS,

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,
Defendants

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM
M.R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

)
)
)
)

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, State of Maine pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and
moves to dismiss the counterclaim.filed by Defendant Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff State of Maine requests that its Motion to Dismiss the
Counterclaim be granted.

Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

Dated: December 18, 2000
LINDA J. CONTI,¿Me. Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE
Plaintiff,
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MOTION TO AMEND
SCHEDULING ORDER
PURSUANT TO M.R. Civ. P. 16(a)
AND INCORPORATED
MEMORANDUM OF LAW

)
)
)

NOW COMES the Plaintiff, State of Maine, and moves to amend the Pretrial
Scheduling Order in this case pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 16(a) for the reasons set forth below.
According to the Pretrial Scheduling Order issued in this case, the parties have ten
(10) days to file any motion to amend or alter the Scheduling Order. Under the current
Scheduling Order the Plaintiff, State of Maine, must designate its expert witness in this case
on or about March 21,2001. The State is requesting an additional thirty (30) days or until
April 20, 2001 to complete the designation of its expert witness in this case. According to the
Scheduling Order, before amendment will be granted a party must demonstrate good cause,
that discovery was timely and diligently conducted and that the extension will not delay trial.
In its investigation into the Defendants’ activities, the State hired H. Alan Mooney,
P.E. as its expert witness in this case. Mr. Mooney has already inspected and written reports
with respect to nine houses constructed by Defendants, which are the subject of this action.
These reports have been provided to the Defendants and a copy is attached hereto.
Subsequent to the completion of the reports, in the summer and fall of 2000 the State
received approximately six new complaints from consumers who had purchased houses
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designed and built by the Defendants. The State’s expert has already begun to inspect these
homes. Mr. Mooney has indicated that it will be a hardship for his firm to complete the
additional inspections and reports by March 21, 2001 due to his firm’s workload. Therefore,
the Plaintiff, State of Maine, is requesting an additional thirty (30) days for its expert to
complete the additional inspections and reports.
The State has contacted Marshall Tinkle, Esq., counsel for the Defendants, and he has
indicated no objection to the Plaintiffs request provided that all other deadlines under the
Order are likewise extended for thirty (30) days. A thirty (30) day extension will not delay the
trial of this matter.
For these reasons, the Plaintiff requests that its deadline for designating its expert
witness in this matter be extended from March 21,2001 to April 20,2001.

CONCLUSION
Wherefore the Plaintiff, State of Maine, requests that this Motion to Amend
Scheduling Order be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

Dated: January 2, 2001

LE
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE,

)
Plaintiff

v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS,
INC. and COTTAGE PARK, INC.
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
TO DISMISS DEFENDANT’S
COUNTERCLAIM

)
)
)

NOW COMES Defendant/Counterclaimant Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.
(“RW B”), by and through its counsel, and pursuant to Rule 7(c) o f the Maine Rules
o f Civil Procedure submits the following Memorandum o f Law in Opposition to
P laintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Counterclaim.
ARGUM ENT
1.

T he C ounterclaim A dequately States a Claim under Rule 12flhK6).

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency o f a complaint or
counterclaim. See Richards v. Soucv. 610 A.2d 268, 270 (Me. 1992). In deciding
such a motion, it is improper to look beyond the four comers o f the pleading. See
Ripley v. Mercier, 482 A.2d 850, 851 (Me. 1984). A dismissal cannot be granted
unless it appears “beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set o f
facts that he might prove in support of his claim.” Potter. Prescott. Jamieson &
Nelson. P.A. v. Campbell. 1998 M.E. 70, ^5, 708 A.2d 283, 285. A dismissal should
be ordered only if the pleading has not set forth the elements o f a cause o f action or

alleged facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief under any legal theory. Id.;
Hamilton v. Greenleaf. 677 A.2d 525, 527 (Me. 1996).
RWB has alleged all o f the necessary elements o f a claim for breach of
contract. Plaintiff knows perfectly well what are the facts underlying the
Counterclaim. As indicated in the Counterclaim, RWB and the State (acting through
the Maine State Oil and Solid Fuel Board) had a dispute over whether RW B’s
chimney installations in two Portland subdivisions complied with applicable
standards (see Counterclaim, ffl[3-6). The State scheduled a series o f hearings, and
the parties appeared to be heading for lengthy and time-consuming litigation. Then,
after intensive negotiations with both the state agency and the Attorney General’s
office, RWB entered into an agreed-upon compromise with the State. That
compromise was memorialized in a six-page consent agreement, signed by both the
chair o f the state agency and Assistant Attorney General Judith M. Peters, on behalf
o f the Department of Attorney General, as well as by RWB. A copy o f the agreement
is attached to the Counterclaim and may be deemed to be incorporated therein by
reference. The agreement provides for a relatively simple and cost-effective, yet
complete, solution to the State’s concerns about the chimneys, by having RWB install
special chimney liners in each residence. In return, the State “agree[d] that no further
agency action will be taken against RWB based on the facts described herein ....”
(Consent Agreement, paragraph 6).
The Counterclaim does not allege an unspecified breach o f contract; rather, it
states that approximately one month after signing the agreement, “the State
announced that it was unilaterally abrogating the consent agreement.” (Counterclaim,
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1J10). Notwithstanding RWB’s continued readiness to perform fully under the
agreement, the State informed RWB that the State would not abide by the agreement.
The only reason given for its repudiation was that, basically, it had changed its mind.
The State,rescheduled a public hearing on the dispute. As a result, RWB wound up
incurring substantially greater expenses and damages than it would have under the
Consent Agreement, even though there never was a finding at the Board level that
RWB had done anything wrong.
In short, the Counterclaim makes it clear that the State entered into a valid
agreement and then breached the agreement to the detriment o f RWB. Nothing more
is needed for a valid breach-of-contract claim. If there was anything in the
Counterclaim that the State was uncertain about, it could have moved for a more
definite statement. The State is not, however, entitled to a dismissal.

2.

The Counterclaim is not Barred bv Sovereign Immunity.

The Plaintiff has raised the defense o f sovereign immunity to RW B’s
Counterclaim. Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion merely tests the legal sufficiency o f
the pleading (as discussed above), it is inappropriate to grant such a motion on the
basis o f an affirmative defense. See Sargent v. Sargent. 622 A.2d 721, 723 (Me.
1993). In any event, Plaintiffs sovereign immunity defense must fail.
As the State acknowledges, sovereign immunity may be waived by statute. In
Waterville Industries. Inc, v. Finance Authority o f Maine. 2000 ME 138, f21, 758
A.2d 986, 992 (cited by Plaintiff), the Law Court permitted a $150,000 breach-ofcontract action against FAME because the statute that had defined the powers of
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FAM E’S predecessor included the power to “[s]ue and be sued in its own name ...
and plead and be impleaded.” See 10 M.R.S.A. §1005(4), repealed by P.L. 1983,
c. 519, §6 (effective Sept. 23, 1983). The Law Court had no trouble concluding that
this language amounted to legislative consent to breach-of-contract suits against
FAME.
As the State further acknowledges, consent agreements by the Oil and Solid
Fuel Board are governed by 10 M.R.S.A. §8003(5)(B). That statute provides in part:
“A consent agreement is enforceable by an action in Superior Court.” By definition,
a consent agreement is bilateral; yet nothing in the statute limits enforcement to one
side and not the other. Clearly, the Legislature intended to confer enforceability to
both parties to the agreement, and not just the State. Moreover, the normative mode
o f enforcing any agreement is through an action for breach o f contract. Again,
nothing in the statute limits such enforceability. Hence, the Legislature could
scarcely have made it any clearer that the State is subject to a breach-of-contract
action for the violation o f a consent agreement. The statute certainly makes the
State’s amenability to such a suit more explicit than the vague “sue and be sued”
language on which the Law Court relied in Waterville Industries.
Furthermore, the State waived any sovereign immunity by suing RWB in the
first place. It is well established that a state may waive its immunity by bringing suit.
Clark v. Barnard. 108 U.S. 436, 447-48, 2 S.Ct. 878, 883, 27 L.Ed. 780 (1883). By
making a “voluntary submission” to the court’s jurisdiction, it subjects itself to any
counterclaims. See id. Department o f Transportation v. American Commercial
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Lines. Inc.. 350 F. Supp. 835, 837 (N.D. 111. 1972): see also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Co.. 200 U.S. 273, 26 S.Ct. 252, 50 L.Ed. 477. It has been stated that
... where a state voluntarily files a suit and submits its rights for
judicial determination, it will be bound thereby, and the defense will be
entitled to plead and prove all matters properly defensive. This includes
the right to make any defense by answer or cross-complaint germane to
the matter in controversy.
Anderson. Clayton & Co., v. State. 122 Tex. 530, 62 S.W. 2d 107, 110 (1933). Cf.
City o f Newark v. United States. 254 F.2d 93, 95 n.l (3rd Cir. 1958)(“In the federal
system, whenever the United States brings an action as plaintiff, it waives its
sovereignty and assumes the status o f a private individual for the purposes o f
counterclaim or defenses. The Siren. 1868, 7 Wall. 152, 154, 19 L. Ed. 129. Where
the defendant has a claim against the United States, “it would be a very rigid
principle, to deny him the right o f setting up such a claim in a court o f justice * *
quoting United States v. Ringgold. 8 Pet. 150, 162 8 L. Ed. 899 (1834).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated in the antique notion that “the
king can do no wrong”; it survived under the justification that susceptibility to
lawsuits would unduly interfere with the necessary business o f government. This
rationale disappears, however, once the government voluntarily goes into the business
o f litigation. It would be grossly unfair if the State could seek substantial monetary
relief against RWB on behalf o f private parties and yet RWB were precluded from
exercising the right to setoff that it would have against any private litigant.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Plaintiffs Motion to
Dismiss.
DATED at Portland, Maine this

3/**^ day o f January, 2001.

David M. Hirshon, Esq.
Bar No. #1036

Marshall J. Tinkle, Esq.
Bar No. #2833
Counsel for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.

Tompkins, Clough, Hirshon
& Langer, P. A.
Three Canal Plaza
P. O. Box 15060
Portland, ME 04112-5060
207-874-6700

F:\Home\DAVID\CURRENT\W einschenk\State2000\Memo.Law 1-2-01 .doc
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

)
)
)
)
)
)

V.

FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,
Defendants

ORDER AMENDING PRETRIAL
SCHEDULING ORDER

)
)
)
)
)

The order and entry is as follows:
The Scheduling Order in this case is amended by agreement of the parties as
follows:
The P laintiffs date for designation of its expert witness in this case shall be 120
days from the date the Pretrial Order was entered or April 20, 2001. The Defendants shall
have sixty (60) days from April 20, 2001 to designate its expert witness in this case. The
Discovery shall be completed not later than September 21, 2001.

Dated:
JUST

1

.

JRT
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,
Defendants

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF’S REPLY
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

The Plaintiff, State of Maine Attorney General, submits this reply memorandum in
support of its motion to dismiss the Defendant, Rie Weinschenk Builders, Inc. (“RWB”)’s
counterclaim.
ARGUMENT
The Plaintiff maintains that RW B’s Counterclaim does not clearly state facts
alleging a claim for breach of contract, offering only conclusory allegations which are
insufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss. Moreover, despite RW B’s clarification in
its opposition to the Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim that this is a contract
and not a tort action, the counterclaim merits dismissal on sovereign immunity grounds.
It is entirely appropriate to grant a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign
immunity. It has long been recognized that immunity is an issue distinct from liability. The
applicability of immunity is a significant question of law, the determination of which is
often dispositive of the case. Polley v. Atwell, 581 A.2d 410,412 (Me. 1990). Because
immunity bars a lawsuit rather than merely provide a defense to liability and is effectively
lost if a case goes forward, it should be determined early in the litigation. Id.

RW B’s arguments that sovereign immunity is waived are unconvincing. RWB
correctly points out that sovereign immunity may be waived by the Legislature. Waterville
Industries. Inc, v. Finance Authority of Maine, 2000 ME 138, <][21, 758 A.2d 986, 992. In
Waterville Industries the State of Maine entered into a commercial sales contract. This
case, in contrast, involves a Consent Decree entered into between Ric Weinschenk
Builders, Inc. and the Maine State Oil and Solid Fuel Board (the “Board”). A Consent
Decree is a product of negotiation by parties who elect to waive their rights to litigate and,
instead, reach a compromise in which the parties each give up something they might have
won through litigation. Such a Decree is in some respects contractual in nature. State v.
Shattuck, 2000 ME 38 ^18, 747 A.2d 174,179. Nonetheless, as the Law Court has held, it
is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and enforceable as, a
judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and
decrees. Id. While the terms of the Consent Decree entered into by the Board and the
Defendant may be enforced as reflected in 10 M.R.S.A. § 8005, there is no provision in
statute for money damages in the event of breach. There is also no provision in the Unfair
Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 206-216, the statute the Plaintiff seeks to enforce, that
waives sovereign immunity.
In its dealings with RWB, the Board was fulfilling a quasi-judicial and
prosecutorial role and therefore is entitled to absolute immunity from damages suits. See
Wang v. New Hampshire Board of Registration in Medicine, 55 F.3d 698 (1st Cir. 1995);
Bettencourt v. Board of Registration of Medicine, 904 F.2d 772, 782-85 ( l stCir. 1990).
RWB suggests that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is an “antique notion”. In
fact, the doctrine is alive and well and appropriately applied in this case. Cases cited by
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RWB stand for the proposition that when a State files an action in Federal Court it waives
11th Amendment immunity, which is not applicable in this case.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should grant the Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss RW B’s
Counterclaim.

Respectfully submitted,
G. STEVEN ROWE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

0

/0
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Dated: January 11, 2001

LINDA J. CONTI, Me. (Bür No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STA TE O F M AIN E,

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
F R E D E R IC D. W EIN SC H EN K ,
))
R IC W E IN SC H E N K B U ILD ERS, INC., )
an d C O T T A G E PA RK , IN C.,
))
D efendants

P L A IN T IF F ’S M OTION TO
ST R IK E JU RY DEMAND
W IT H INCORPORATED
M EM ORANDUM OF LAW

)

Plaintiff now moves to strike the Defendants’ demand for a jury trial, pursuant to M.R.
Civ.P. Rule 39(a)(2), on the grounds that the right of trial by jury does not exist for claims
under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 207 and 209, because such claims are
equitable in nature or ancillary to equitable claims.
M EM O R A N D U M O F LAW
I.

T H E R IG H T O F T R IA L BY JU R Y D O ES N O T EX IST UNDER TH E
C O N ST IT U T IO N O R STATUTES O F T H E STA TE OF MAINE FO R CLA IM S
TH A T A R E EQ U IT A B L E IN N A TU RE.
Under Article I, Section 20 of the Maine Constitution, parties in all civil actions

have the right to a trial by jury, except in cases where civil actions were historically tried
without a jury. Department of Environmental Protection v. Emerson, 616 A.2d 1268, 1271
(Me. 1992). In deciding whether jury trials have traditionally been permitted, courts will look
to common law and Massachusetts statutory law as it existed prior to the adoption of the
Maine Constitution. See City of Portland v. DePaolo, 531 A.2d 669 (Me. 1987). Jury trials are
not available for claims that are equitable in nature because jury trials were not available in

such cases prior to the adoption of the Maine Constitution. Kennebec Federal Savings & Loan

Association, 695 A.2d 1201 (Me. 1997). Because matters in equity were never triable of right
to a jury, the right to a trial does not exist for claims sounding in equity. DesMarais v.

Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 844 (Me. 1995).
II.

T H E COURT SH O U LD ST R IK E T H E D EFEN D A N TS’ JU RY TRIA L
DEM AND LIST, SIN C E TH E R E M E D IE S SO U G H T ARE EQ U ITA BLE IN
NATURE AND A N CILLA R Y TO E Q U IT A B L E R EL IEF.
W hether a claim is legal or equitable depends upon the basic nature of the claim,

including the remedy sought, as evidenced by the source of the claim or the nature of the
pleadings. DiCentes v. Michaud, 1998 ME 227 f8 , 719 A.2d 509. In the present case, the
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, civil penalties, restitution and costs to remedy Defendants’
unfair and deceptive acts or practices in connection with their home construction business
under 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 207, 209. Complaint, f 1. The U nfair Trade Practices Act vests the trial
court with Considerable discretion to fashion an equitable remedy once a finding of unlawful
trade practices has been made. State of Maine v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362
(Me. 1987). Because an action brought pursuant to the Unfair Trade Practices Act seeks
equitable relief, there is no right to a jury trial.
Even in cases where monetary damages, such as a civil penalty, are sought, ancillary
to a request for injunctive relief, the Law Court has held that a jury trial is not required by the
Constitution. In Department of Environmental Protection v. Emerson, the State sought an
injunction and monetary penalties for violation of state environmental laws. Holding that the
Defendant had no right to a jury trial, the court stated:
Here, the equitable jurisdiction of the Superior Court was invoked to grant injunctive
relief authorized by statute. Courts of equity have traditionally proceeded “to dispose
of the entire controversy and render complete relief.” ... The present action is equitable

in nature and involves only ancillary coercive civil penalties. Because of the contrary
practice at common law, a jury trial is not required by the Constitution.

Department of Environmental Protection v. Emerson, 616 A .2d at 1271.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff State of Maine respectfully requests
that the Court strike the Defendants’ Demand For Jury Trial.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: January 26, 2001
LINDA J. C O N l/- Me. Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department o f Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333
Tel. (207) 626 8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

)
)
Plaintiff
)
)
v.
)
)
FR E D E R IC D. W EINSCHENK,
)
R IC W EIN SCH ENK BUILDERS, INC., )
an d CO TTA G E PARK, INC.,
)
)
Defendants
)

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STA TE O F MAINE,

R EQ U EST FO R H EA R IN G ON
PL A IN T IFF’S M O TIO N TO
ST R IK E JU R Y DEMAND

We request the Clerk to schedule the pending Motion to Strike Jury Demand on the
next available date.
The matter to be heard is
(

) Testimonial

( X ) Non-Testimonial

To the nearest one-quarter hour, my good faith estimate of the time, which the
hearing will take, is 30 minutes.

Dated: January 26, 2001
LINDA J. CONTI - M e/B ar No.3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
v.

ORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)

FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,
Defendants

After hearing on the State’s Motion to Dismiss the Defendant’s Ric Weinschenk
Builders, Inc.’s Counterclaim, the Order and entry is as follows: the State’s Motion to
Dismiss the Counterclaim is Granted.
JM W UM w Cj

Dated:
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JUSTICE, SUPERIOR COUR'
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SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE

)
)
)

Plaintiff

)
)

V.

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

)

FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
)
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC., )
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,
)
)
)

Defendants

Plaintiff State of Maine requests that the Defendants Frederic Weinschenk, Ric
Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc. produce the documents described below for
inspection and copying at the office of the Department of Attorney General, 286 Water Street,
4th Floor of the Key Bank Building, Augusta, Maine, within thirty (30) days of service o f this
request pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 34.

INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITION
1.

The term “defendants” means Defendants Frederic Weinshenk, Ric Weinschenk

Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park, Inc.
2.

The term “person” and “persons” include, but are not limited to, individuals,

corporations, companies, partnerships, unincorporated business associations, organizations,
estates, trusts, governmental bodies, or any other entity composed of persons.
3.

The term “documents” means, without limitation, all writings, documents,

recordings, data stored in computer files (which may be produced for use on floppy disks or
other means), photos, audio or video tapes and/or other tangible things or duplicates of or

copies of said writings, and non-identical copies bearing or having any attachments, notes or
marks which distinguish them from the originals.
4.

The term “contract” means any written agreement, including any attachment or

amendment to it, that is governed the relationship between the identified parties or entities at
any time since and including 1995, even if the agreement was entered into before that date.
5.

If Defendants withhold any document on the grounds of any privilege,

Defendants shall provide a statement setting forth the following information with respect to
each: (1) the name and title of the author, and, if different, the preparer and signatory; (2) the
name and title of the person to whom the document was addressed; (3) the names and titles of
all persons to whom the document or a copy of the document was sent or to whom the
document or a copy, or any part thereof, was shown; (4) the date of the document; (5) the
number of pages; (6) a brief description of the subject matter; (7) the nature of the privilege
claim; and (8) the document request to which it is responsive.
DOCUM ENTS REQUESTED
1.

A document or documents which reflect the name and address of all persons

employed by the Defendants from January 1, 1995 to the present.
2.

A document or documents which reflects the names and addresses of all

subcontractors hired by the Defendants from January 1, 1995 to the present.
3.

A copy of all documents that reflect the Defendants’ advertising or promotion of

building lots and buildings in Cottage Park, Summer Place and Willow Developments.
4.

All documents including, but not limited to, contracts for purchase and sale,

building plans and change orders relating to the following properties:
a.

25 Porch Street, Cottage Park;

2

5.

b.

5 Porch Street, Cottage Park;

c.

20 Porch Street, Cottage Park;

d.

25 Shingle Way, Cottage Park;

e.

12 Cottage Park Road, Cottage Park;

f.

10 Porch Street, Cottage Park;

g.

31 Summer Place;

h.

61 Summer Place;

i.

69 Summer Place;

j.

55 Summer Place;

k.

48 Willow Lane;

l.

28 Willow Lane;

m.

41 Willow Lane;

n.

5 Summer Place

Copies of all documents reflecting complaints or requests for service sent to the

Defendants from persons who purchased houses built by the Defendants.
6.

Copies of all documents reflecting communications between Defendants and the

City of Portland Code Enforcement Department.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 14, 2001

UNDi

). 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department o f Attorney General
State House Station 6
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STA TE O F M AINE,
Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244
)
)
)
)

v.

)
)

F R E D E R IC D. W EINS CHENK,
)
R IC W EIN S C H EN K B U ILD ERS, INC., )
an d C O T T A G E PARK, INC.,
)
)
D efendants
)

P L A IN T IF F ’S REPLY
M EM ORA N D U M IN SUPPORT
O F ITS M O T IO N TO STRIK E
D EFEN D A N TS’ JU R Y DEMAND

In its opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Jury Demand, the Defendants’
argue that they are entitled to a jury trial in this case because the Plaintiff’s claim for civil
penalties predominates the complaint. The Defendants further argue that Department of
Environmental Protection v. Emerson. 616 A.2d 1268 (Me. 1992) is distinguishable.
Plaintiff’s claim for civil penalties does not predominate the complaint. The complaint seeks
three types of relief: injunctive relief, restitution and civil penalties. Injunctive relief and
restitution are clearly equitable. In this case, as in Emerson, the equitable jurisdiction of the
Superior Court was invoked to grant injunctive relief authorized by statute. Courts of equity
have traditionally proceeded to dispose of the entire controversy and render complete relief.
Emerson at 1271 (quotations omitted). Because the present action is equitable in nature and
involves only ancillary civil penalties, the Defendants are not entitled to a jury trial. The
Plaintiff has met its burden of showing that the practice before 1820 was to deny a jury in this
type of civil proceeding.

The Defendants claim that they are entitled to a jury trial on their counterclaim is
moot, as the counterclaim has been dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons and the reasons stated in the P laintiffs Memorandum in Support of
its Motion to Strike Defendants’ Jury Demand, the Plaintiff requests that the Court strike the
Defendants’ Demand for a jury trial and place this case on the non jury list for trial.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February 16, 2001
LINDA J. CONTI - Mei Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333
Tel. (207) 626 8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
v.
FREDERIC D. WEINSCHENK,
RIC W EINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
and COTTAGE PARK, INC.,
Defendants

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
REPORT COURT ORDERS

IN TRO D U CTIO N

Defendants’ Frederic Weinschenk, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. and Cottage Park,
Inc. ("Defendants") have filed a motion pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 72 (b) and (c) requesting that
this Court report the order of February 7,2001 dismissing the Defendants' counterclaim and
the order of March 7, 2001 granting the Plaintiff’s motion to strike jury demand to the Law
Court on the grounds that an interlocutory appeal is justified under the circumstances.
Plaintiff, State of Maine Attorney General (“Plaintiff’), submits this memorandum in
opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Report.
FACTS
On or about November 20, 2000, the Plaintiff brought this action against the
Defendants alleging that they engaged in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in connection
with the sale and construction of houses. Pursuant to 5 M.R.S.A. § 209, the Plaintiff seeks an
injunction, restitution for consumers harmed by Defendants’ unfair and deceptive practices
and civil penalties. The Defendants answered the complaint and asserted a counterclaim

against the Oil and Solid Fuel Board, a State agency. The Plaintiff moved to dismiss the
counterclaim. On February 7, 2001, the Court granted the Plaintiffs motion finding that the
counterclaim was not allowed under M.R. Civ. P. 13.
The Defendants also filed a jury demand. The Plaintiff moved to strike the jury
demand on the grounds that the Plaintiffs claims for an injunction and restitution are
equitable and the claims for civil penalties are ancillary to the equitable claims. Finding that
the facts were indistinguishable from those in Department of Environmental Protection v.
Emerson. 616 A. 2d 1268 (Me. 1992), the court granted the P lain tiffs motion to strike jury
demand. The Defendants are now requesting that these questions be reported to the Law
Court. The Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Report for the reasons set forth below.

ARGUM ENT
A.

S tan d ard for Reporting Q uestions to the Law C o u rt

The Defendants cite M.R. Civ. P 72(b) and (c) in their Motion to Report. This rule has
recently been revised and now appears as Rule 24 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure,
a copy of which is attached.1 M. R. App. P. 24(b) provides for a report "upon the request of
all parties appearing" when there is agreement as to all material facts, if the trial court is of the
opinion that the question of law is of sufficient importance or doubt to justify a report. In this
case, not all of the parties appearing have requested the report; consequently, M. R. App. P.
24(b) is inapplicable.
Rule 24(c) which governs this motion provides:
If the trial court is of the opinion that a question of law involved in an
interlocutory order or ruling made by it ought to be determined by the
Law Court before any further proceedings are taken, it may on motion
1 The Plaintiff will refer to Rule 24 of the Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure as the rules were
effective January 1, 2001. Substantively former rule 72 and new rule 24 are the same.
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of the aggrieved party report the case to the Law Court for that purpose
and stay all further proceedings except such as are necessary to preserve
the rights of the parties without making any decision therein.2
A report pursuant to Rule 72 (c) is an exception to the final judgment rule and should be used
sparingly. Luhr v. Bickford. 661 A. 2d 1141, 1142 (Me. 1995)(citations omitted); Sirois v.
Winslow. 585 A. 2d 183,184-85 (Me. 1991). To avoid the transformation of the Law Court
into an advisory board for the direction of the business of the court at nisi prius. the Law
Court has applied the "importance and doubt" standard to cases reported under M. R.Civ. P
72(c). Id. Questions of law reported must be of sufficient importance and doubt to outweigh
the policy against piecemeal litigation. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop. 692 A. 2d 441,
443(Me. 1997) see Toussaint v. Perreault. 388 A. 2d 918,920 (Me. 1978)(discharging report
where all issues could have been presented in one appeal taken after conclusion of the
litigation, thereby avoiding, "the ’piecemeal’ approach which we deplore[]"). Another
consideration in determining whether to report a question to the Law Court is whether the
issue might not have to be decided at all because of other possible dispositions. Sirois. 585 A.
2d at 185. Although not required by the rule, the Court may take into consideration whether a
decision would at least in one alternative dispose of the action Swanson. 692 A. 2d at 443.
Finally the Court must consider whether a report will encourage piecemeal litigation in cases
involving similar circumstances. Morris v. Sloan. 698 A. 2d 1038, 1041(Me. 1997).
B.
T he Issue Determined by the C o u rt’s O rd e r D ated M arch 7, 2001
G ranting the P laintiff’s Motion to S trike D efendants’ J u ry D em and, is not of Sufficient
Im portance an d D oubt to Justify a R eport to the Law C ourt for an Interlocutory Appeal
Defendants argue that whether or not a party is entitled to a jury trial is of sufficient
importance to warrant a report. Defendants cite Thermos v. Spence. 1999 ME 129, 735 A. 2d

2 Defendants do not seek a stay of proceedings. See Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Report at 4.
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484; and Kennebec Federal Savings Loan Ass’n v. Kueter. 1998 ME 12311, 695 A. 2d 1201,
1202 as authority for this position. This case is distinguishable from the cases cited by the
Defendants because there is no doubt that the Defendants are not entitled to a jury trial. To
warrant a report, Defendants must show both importance and doubt. Luhr. 661 A. 2d at 1142.
In this case a prior Law Court decision, Department of Environmental Protection v. Emerson.
616 A. 2d 1268 (Me. 1992) is controlling. Because there is insufficient doubt about the
question of whether Defendants are entitled to a jury trial, the request for a report on the issue
should be denied.

C.
Counterclaim

Rule 24 Governing Reports Does Not Apply to Dismissal of a

The Defendants argue that the Court should also report the issue of whether the
counterclaim is barred. Because M.R. Civ. P. 54 (b) governs appeals when fewer than all
claims are determined, alternate methods of obtaining review are not applicable. Musson v.
Godlev. 1999 ME 19317 n. 3, 742 A. 2d 479,481. Therefore, the Defendants' Motion to
Report the Court's Order dated February 7, 2001, dismissing the counterclaim pursuant to
M.R. App. P. 24 should be denied.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff, State of Maine Attorney General requests
that Defendants’ Motion to Report the Court's Orders of February 7, 2001 (Granting State's
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim) and March 7, 2001 (Granting State's Motion to Strike Jury
Demand) pursuant to former M. R. Civ. P. 72 (b) or (c) be denied.
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Respectfully submitted,
G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General

Dated: March 30, 2001
LINDA J. CONTI
Bar No. 3638
Assistant Attome'/General
Department of Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800
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Em ergency hearing date:
Sept. 11, 2002, 1:00 p.m.
UNITED STATES B A N K R U PTCY COURT
D ISTR IC T O F M A IN E

INRE:
RIC WEINSCHENK BUILDERS, INC.,
Debtor

)
)
)
)
)

Chapter 7
Case No. 02-21431

)

STA TE OF M A IN E ’S M O T IO N F O R EM ER G EN C Y H EA R IN G

NOW COMES the State of Maine pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-l(j)
and moves for an emergency motion to consider its request for relief from stay. The
State of Maine is set to commence trial today in Kennebec County Superior Court in the
case of State of Maine v, Frederic D. Weinschenk. Ric Weinschenk Builders. Inc., and
Cottage Park. Inc.. Docket Number CV-00-244. Yesterday afternoon, on the eve of trial,
one of the Defendants, Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc. filed the above-captioned Chapter
7 petition. Justice Studstrup, the trial justice in the state case, has expressed reluctance to
move forward with the trial unless and until the Bankruptcy Court has granted the State
relief from the automatic stay.
By motion filed with the Court today, the State is seeking that relief. Emergency
relief is justified in this case where the state court case is scheduled to commence today,
with the witnesses and parties ready to proceed. It is the State’s understanding that the
Court has agreed to hear this matter by telephone today at 1:00 p.m. In light of the
emergency nature of the relief requested and the shortness of time allowed for providing
notice, the State requests, pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 9013-l(j)(2), the Court to

allowit to provide notice to the debtor’s counsel, the trustee, and the U.S. Trustee by fax
and telephone.
WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests the Court grant its motion for
emergency hearing to hear the State’s emergency request for relief from stay.

DATED: September 11, 2002
ELIZABETH J. WYMAN
Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04430
207/626-8800
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, SS.

STATE OF MAINE,

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

)
)

Plaintiff

)
)

v.

)

PLAINTIFF'S REPLYMEMORANDUM

)

FREDERIC WEINSCHENK, et al„)
)

Defendants

)

Defendants have failed to refute the evidence before this Court of the num erous
examples of their defective construction practices and failures to correct, and their
m isrepresentations to the consumers who bought their houses. Although they have
attem pted to shift the blame for their defective houses to the consumers, w ho did not
understand that they were buying "bargain" homes; to the City of Portland for issuing
certificates of occupancy; to Alan Mooney, P.E., for offering opinions based on "gross
exaggerations"; and to the Attorney General for bringing this action to address the
harm caused to a "handful of private individuals", they are ultim ately responsible for
the defects, their failures to correct, and their m isrepresentations, which are violations
of § 207 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act ("the UTPA").
Ric W einschenk told the homeowners that they w ould be getting customdesigned quality homes. None of the consumers who testified thought that they had

contracted for a bargain home equivalent to Section 8 housing1. If they had purchased
Section 8 housing, it is unlikely that they w ould have experienced the leaking windows
and roofs common to the defendants' houses.
The City's issuance of certificates of occupancy does not shield the defendants
from responsibility for the defects in their houses. There was no evidence suggesting
that the issuance of a certificate of occupancy means that a home has met all building
codes. In fact, the defendants' expert, Alexander Hutcheon, testified that the issuance of
a certificate of occupancy by the City of Portland simply means that the w ork on the
house is complete.
The defendants concede that the w indow s Ric Weinschenk designed leak
significantly, but their theories about why the window s leak (defective sealant and lack
of hom eow ner maintenance) are not credible, and neither is the proposed rem edy of
new sealants installed at a cost of $100 per w indow, regardless of size. These houses
were new w hen the leaks first appeared, typically during the first heavy rainstorm.
According to Alan Mooney, any attem pt at repair of these w indow s is only a short-term
fix, w hich can only be perm anently rectified by their replacement. Similarly, any
attem pt at repairing the leaking roofs by caulking will not address the real cause of the
leaks, which according to Mr. Mooney is poor installation. If, in fact, the defendants
could have repaired all of the problems w ith the subject homes for a total of $20,000,

1 Defendants assert that their price-per-square-foot basis was a "bargain" at a price under $170,000 yet, in
comparing this to an "average" Portland home selling for $180,000, they neglect to factor in the cost of the
lot, sold by Ric Weinschenk through his Cottage Park corporation, at an additional cost to the
homeowner of $35,000 - $50,000. Defendants' homes are, therefore, significantly more expensive than
Section 8 housing or the "average" home in Portland.
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why did they not? Defendants' petitions for bankruptcy, which just happened to be
filed at the time of this trial, leads inexorably to the conclusion that they do not believe
that the defects in the houses can be rem edied as inexpensively as they claim. One
cannot view the cracked foundation in Denise N ovotny's home, for example, and
believe that it can be fixed for the tiny sum claimed by defendants as opposed to Mr.
Mooney's estimate, which is supported by detailed observation and analysis.
Finally, defendants' attem pts to create some confusion over the applicability of
Section 209 of the UTPA m ust be viewed as mere obfuscation of the clear d uty of the
Attorney General to protect the public against unlaw ful practices. Their discussion of
Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194 (Me. 1979), a case involving a private right of action
under § 213 of the UTPA, has no direct application to this case, w ith the exception,
however, of the Court's analysis of the UTPA, w hich further reinforces the Attorney
General's position that this Office m ay m aintain UTPA cases, even if the sam e case
could not be brought by an individual pursuant to § 213. Further, D efendants' assertion
that FTC Consent Orders have no precedential value is unsupported. In fact, the UPTA
requires that the Court be guided by the Federal Trade Com mission's interpretation of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(A)(1). See § 207(1); see also Bartner,
405 A.2d at 199-200. The FTC's interpretations are often found in policy statements,
rules and consent decrees2.

2 FTC consent decrees, like rules and policy statements, are all voted on by the Federal Trade
Commissioners, and not simply executed by staff. Hence, they reflect the Commission's interpretations
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
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The State acknowledges that it is reasonable to expect to find "occasional"
deficiencies in new homes. The defendants built m any houses in the subject
developments, but the absence of as many complaints is not "undisputed" evidence
that the defendants7customers were "completely satisfied". Individuals m ake different
accommodations to similar conditions, and m ay w ish to overlook problem s if they love
their houses or if they know that their properties have increased in value just because of
the nature of the Portland housing market. Other consumers may fear that testifying
about their defective homes im pair their ability to sell them. The consum ers who
complained and testified before this Court have deficiencies in their hom es caused by
defendants that are major and pervasive; and any attem pts at requesting repairs from
the defendants were largely ignored. It is entirely appropriate that the State seek
redress under § 209 of the UTPA for the consumers harm ed by defendants' practices.
The injunctive relief that the State has requested is necessary to protect the public
interest. Com m onwealth v. Elm Medical Laboratories, 596 N.E.2d 376 (Mass. 1992) (the
standard for determ ining w hether an injunction should be issued is w hether it is
designed to protect the public interest). Although the Court has discretion to find that
civil penalties and dam ages are an adequate rem edy w ithout issuing an injunction
(State ex rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981); State ex rel. Fisher v.
Rowe's Chevrolet, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 50 (Ohio 1993)), civil penalties and dam ages are
insufficient in this case. Future consumers m ust be protected from the defendants'
unfair trade practices, and m onetary penalties are of little consequence if the defendants
are insolvent.

4

Defendants claim that an injunction is unnecessary because they have stopped
the unlawful practices. If the Court accepts this argum ent, defendants will be free to
revert to their old practices once the case is over, w ith no real consequences to them.
An injunction is a rem edy designed to control future behavior, and whether that
behavior is occurring at the time of the injunction is generally irrelevant. State ex rel.
Douglas v. Ledwith, 281 N.W.2d 729 (Neb. 1979); Com m onw ealth ex rel. Stevens v.
Isaac's, 577 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Lowell Gas Co. v. Attorney General, 385
N.E.2d 240 (Mass. 1979).
Contrary to defendants' assertions, the injunctive relief requested by the State
does not go "too far" as it perm its defendants to conduct a legitimate business while
preventing future m isconduct and harm to the public. This type of injunctive relief has
been sanctioned by the Law Court, which approved an order of the trial court enjoining
a m otel owner from having any contact w ith the public, State v. Shattuck, 747 A.2d 174
(Me. 2000), and w hich upheld a trial court's order requiring a car dealer to re-rust proof
custom ers' cars. State v. Bob Chambers' Ford, 522 A.2d 362 (Me. 1987). Examples of
injunctive relief granted by courts in cases brought by Attorneys General to enforce
unfair and deceptive trade practices are m yriad. See Sheldon and Carter, Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices, § 10.7.1.3.3 (National Consumer Law Center, Fifth ed.
2001 and Supp. 2002) (collecting cases). 3

3 Cases discussed in this section include Brown v. Columbus Remodeling and Builders, Inc.,
Clearinghouse No. 27, 064 (Ohio C.P. Franklin Cty. 1978) (home improvement contractor was enjoined
from doing business unless it disclosed to each consumer that the company had been found to engage in
unfair and deceptive practices and paid off former customers owed money); Commonwealth v. Elm
Medical Laboratories. Inc., 596 N.E.2d 376 (individuals prohibited from having any involvement in their
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1
For the reasons set forth in this Reply M em orandum and in the State's Post-Trial
Brief, which was filed previously, the State requests that this Court find that the
defendants violated the Unfair Trade Practices Act, and issue an injunction and an
order providing for restitution and civil penalties.

Dated:

October 25,2002

Respectfully subm itted,
G . ST E V E N R O W E

Attorney General

/s '

O'

L IN D A J. C O N T I

Maine Bar No. 3638"
C A R O L Y N A. SILSBY

Maine Bar No. 3030
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of the A ttorney General
Consum er Protection Division
6 State House Station
Augusta, ME 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8800
A tto rn e y s fo r th e S tate

former business field for five years); People ex rel, Abrams v. Robbins, Clearinghouse No. 50, 409 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Mar. 14,1994) (business enjoined from engaging in any enterprise involving the public without
first establishing a surety bond).
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

STATE OF MAINE.
Plaintiff
INJUNCTION AND ORDER

V,

FREDERIC WEINSCHENK
an d RICK WEINSCHENK
BUILDERS, INC.,
Defendants
Defendants Frederic Weinschenk and Rick W einschenk Builders, Inc., having
been declared in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, are hereby ENJOINED and
are ORDERED as follows:
Frederic W einschenk and Rick Weinschenk Builders, Inc., their agents, servants,
officers, employees and attorneys, and those persons in active concert or participation
w ith them who receive actual notice of this injunction are perm anently enjoined from
building or constructing residential dwellings in the State of Maine unless:
A.

Defendants em ploy an engineer who is registered w ith the Maine Board

of Professional Engineers to certify that the home is built to applicable codes and to
generally accepting building practices; and
B.

Defendants have all building plans for single family residences reviewed

a n d stam ped by a M aine licensed Engineer or Architect.
C.

Defendants have submitted a copy of all advertising or other

prom otional materials and contract forms which will be used, to the Office of the
A ttorney General for that office's information and review.
D.

Defendants have subm itted to the Office of the A ttorney General a copy

of th e contract and specifications for each house.
So ordered.

O3

/).

Dated: December
2002
Time: 5 1 3 0 A A1
S. Kirk Studstrup
Justice, Superior Court

STATE OF MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CrVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. CV-00-244

KENNEBEC, ss.

STATE OF MAINE,
Plaintiff
D E C IS IO N A N D O R D E R
O N M O T IO N S

V.

FREDERIC WEINSCHENK, et al,
Defendants
This m atter came before the court on the defendants' m otion to stay injunction,
m otion to am end or alter judgm ent, and request for additional findings. The motions
w ill be considered separately below.
Since the court has considered the d efen d an ts' m otion to am end or alter
ju d g m en t below and grants that m otion in part, the m otion to stay the injunction is
denied.
The court has review ed its nine-page decision and believes th at the decision
contains sufficient findings to explain the rationale of the decision and for appellate
purposes. The request for further findings is denied.
The defendants' m otion to alter or am end the court's order and injunction is
granted in p art as follows:
(1)

Concerning the requirem ents of the injunction, the court will grant the

m otion in part. The defendants argue that the conditions of the injunction do not m atch
the problem s identified w ith regard to the houses the defendants built. The court
disagrees. The court has no intention of putting the defendants out-of-business or of
stifling Mr. W einschenk's innovation and creativity. Instead, the court's goal is to
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en su re th at the d e fen d an ts' fu tu re hom e construction m eets applicable code
requirem ents and is soundly constructed. Review of the building plans by an engineer
or architect w ould help achieve this goal, but by itself w ould not accomplish it. Given
the defendants' track record in the various Portland developm ents, nothing less than an
on-site inspection will suffice. H ow ever, in order to provide a reasonable margin of
compliance, the court will accept the am endm ent proposed by the plaintiff to address
the defendants' concerns. That am endm ent will be reflected in a separate am ended
injunction and order.
(2)

W ith regard to the order of restitution, specifically that portion of the

restitu tio n allocated in the court's order to "C outreau" and "Buell," it was not the
court's intention that the restitution allocated w ould necessarily be paid to those nam ed
individuals. The use of the nam e w as sim ply a sh o rth an d w ay of identifying the
specific houses w hich w ere the subject of the evidence. To clarify, the court's intent is
th at the restitution allocated should be paid to those individuals who at this point in
tim e w ould bear the expense of repairs necessitated by the im properly installed a n d /o r
designed roofs. In the case of the "Coutreau" house, that individual presum ably w ould
be the p resent ow ner of the residence.

In the case of "Buell," that individual

presum ably w ould be the owner of the house in which Ms. Buell resides or the owner's
legal representative.
(3)

The court has reconsidered the cost of replacing the roofs in question, b u t

declines to make any change in its finding or order.
For the reasons stated above, the entry will be:
(1)
M otion to stay injunction is DENIED.
(2)
Request for additional findings is DENIED.
(3)
M otion to am end or alter judgm ent is GRANTED IN PART
as reflected in a separate am ended Order and Injunction.
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Dated: February^ ‘ , 2003
S. Kirk Studstrup
Justice, Superior Court

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

)
)

Frederic D. Weinschenk, d/b/a
Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.,
Debtor

Chapter 7
Case No. 02-21455 JBH

)
)
)
)
)
)-

State o f Maine Attorney General
Plaintiff
V.

Frederic D. Weinschenk, d/b/a
Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc.
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Adv. Proceeding No.

C O M PLA IN T

NOW COMES the Attorney General for the State o f Maine and complains against the
Debtor, Frederic D. Weinschenk, d/b/a Ric Weinschenk Builders, Inc., as follows:

THE PARTIES
1.

The Defendant/Debtor, Frederic D. Weinschenk d/b/a Ric W einschenk Builders,

Inc., filed a Chapter 13 petition with this Court on September 13, 2002, which was converted to
case under Chapter 7 on September 30, 2003.
2.
General.

The Plaintiff, State o f Maine, is a sovereign state acting through the Attorney

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

The Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523. Jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157, 1334, and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408, 1409.
This action is commenced pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 7001 and 7003, Fed. R. Civ. P. 3 and
Local Rule 7003.
4.

This matter is core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) in that it

objects to the D ebtor’s discharge o f a particular debt.

THE FACTS
5.

On or about November 6, 2000, the State filed a civil suit against Frederic D.

W einschenk for violations o f the Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A. § 207.
6.

A trial was held on the Complaint in Kennebec County Superior Court in

September o f 2002.
7.

A fter trial, the Superior Court issued an order finding that Frederic D.

W einschenk engaged in unfair and deceptive practices in his home construction business. A
copy o f the Court’s Decision and Order, Injunction and Amended Injunction are attached to this
Complaint as Exhibits A, B and C respectively.
8.

In its Decision and Order, the Court found that Frederic Weinschenk

misrepresented the quality o f the homes he constructed for consumers.
9.

The Court also found that Ric Weinschenk Builders Inc., the entity that contracted

with consumers and constructed the houses, is the alter ego o f Frederic Weinschenk.
10.

The Court ordered total restitution o f $221,256 for the benefit o f consumers who

were the direct and indirect purchasers o f defectively constructed homes from Frederic
Weinschenk. The Court also awarded the State its costs o f litigation o f $69,829.51.
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11.

In this adversary proceeding the State seeks a determination that the restitution

owed to homeowners who purchased homes directly from Frederic W einschenk is
nondischargeable as follows:
John Mullen
Aaron and Nancy Tufts
Laura Thibodeau
Denise Novotny

12.

$22,400
$25,550
$19,360
$75,556

The State also seeks a determination that its court awarded costs o f $69,829.51

are nondischargeable.
13.

Frederic Weinschenk built three housing developments in Portland, Maine in the

1990s. Cottage Park was first, followed by the Summer Place Development and then Willow
Development.
14.

Frederic W einschenk was aware o f several problems homeowners had with the

Cottage Park homes, such as leaks and structural defects, when he began construction o f Summer
Place and the Willow Development.
15.

Dr. John Mullen, who had recently moved to Maine, entered into a contract with

Frederic W einschenk for the construction o f a new home in the Summer Place Development. He
moved into his new home in January o f 1996. He immediately experienced burst pipes and
leaking roofs and windows.
16.

The Mullen contract specified that the home was a custom home to be built to all

applicable standards. Frederic W einschenk never disclosed to Dr. M ullen any o f the issues his
construction practices had generated in the Cottage Park Development.
17.

In October o f 1997, Aaron and Nancy Tufts moved into their new Weinschenk

home in Summer Place.
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18.

The Tufts had met with W einschenk numerous times prior to entering into the

contract with Weinschenk. They believed based on information given them by Weinschenk that
he was an architect.
19.

Frederic Weinschenk told the Tufts that the home he built for them was o f

superior quality and a good value.
20.

Frederic Weinschenk did not tell the Tufts o f problems with houses in the Cottage

Park Development.
21.

Soon after the Tufts moved into their home, it rained and the windows and ro o f

22.

Denise Novotny moved into her Weinschenk home in early 1998.

23.

In discussion with Novotny and in her construction contract, Frederic W einschenk

leaked.

represented that the home would be a custom home o f very good quality. He did not disclose to
her that residents o f Cottage Park and Summer Place were complaining about roof and window
leaks.
24.

Soon after Ms. Novotny moved into her home she experienced roof and window

leaks, as well as a defective foundation which renders the house structurally unsound.
25.

Laura Thibodeau entered into a contract with Frederic Weinschenk for the

construction o f a home in the W illow Development.
26.

Frederic Weinschenk represented to Ms. Thibodeau that the home would be o f

good quality and built in accordance with applicable codes and standards. He did not tell Ms.
Thibodeau that he was aware that many people who had purchased homes in Cottage Park and
Summer Place had complaints about leaks and other structural issues.
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27.

Ms. Thibodeau moved into the home in December o f 1998. The driveway was

defectively designed and constructed so that it was unusable. The driveway retaining walls were
insufficiently supported and failed. M any windows in the home leaked.
28.

Frederic Weinschenk represented to consumers, Mullen, Tufts, Novotny and

Thibodeau that the homes he builds are custom homes o f good to superior quality which is not
true.
29.

The consumers relied upon Frederic W einschenk’s representations regarding the

quality o f the homes to their detriment.
30.

Frederic Weinschenk made affirmative and false representations in the written

specifications for these homes that they would be o f good quality and would be built to
applicable codes.
31.

Frederic Weinschenk represented to consumers that their homes were “unique,”

“custom” and “one-of-a kind designs” tailored to individual specifications.
32.

Frederic Weinschenk has previously testified that he built these homes as cheaply

as possible. H e never disclosed to the consumers that the homes would be cheaply built.

COUNT I
FRAUD, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)
3 3.
34.

The Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding paragraphs o f this Complaint.
Section 523(a)(2)(A) o f the United States Bankruptcy Code disallows a debtor in

bankruptcy from being discharged for a debt incurred through fraudulent means.
3 5.

Frederic Weinschenk violated M aine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act b y building

defective houses and making intentional and knowing misrepresentations to induce consumers to
purchase those houses.
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36.

Individuals, in reliance upon Frederic Weinschenk’s fraudulent

misrepresentations, purchased houses that required extensive and expensive repairs.
WHEREFORE, the State o f Maine Attorney General prays this Court determine
that the State’s judgment for restitution for consumers who are incidental beneficiaries o f the
State’s enforcement action in the amount o f $142, 866 and for the attorneys fees and costs o f
$69,829.51 awarded to the State in pursuing its judgment are a nondischargeable debt pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).

COUNT II
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS CONDUCT, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)
37.

The Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates the foregoing paragraphs as

though fully set forth herein.
38.

The Unfair Trade Practices A ct 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 205-A through 214 allows the

State to bring an action to restrain a defendant from engaging conduct that is harmful to the
public.
39.

Section 523(a)(6) o f the United States Bankruptcy Code prevents a debtor from

receiving a discharge for a debt resulting from the debtor’s willful and malicious conduct, which
has been defined as conduct wherein the debtor acted without justification or excuse and with
full knowledge o f the specific consequences o f his conduct, knowing full well that his conduct
will cause particularized injury.
40.

Frederic W einschenk’s conduct in misrepresenting to consumers the quality o f the

homes that he designed and built was without justification or excuse and was done with full
knowledge o f the specific consequences o f his conduct and with full knowledge that his conduct
would cause particularized injury.
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41.

A s a result o f the Frederic W einschenk’s willful and malicious conduct, members

o f the public and the Plaintiff State o f M aine suffered damages in the following amounts:
restitution $142,866 and attorneys fees and costs o f $69,829.51.
WHEREFORE, the State o f M aine Attorney General prays this Court determine
its judgment against the Frederic W einschenk for restitution and attorneys fees is a
nondischargeable debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
WHEREFORE, the State o f Maine Attorney General prays this Court:
A.

Enter judgment in favor o f the Plaintiff and against the Defendant Frederic

W einschenk by determining that the State’s judgment for restitution, costs and attorneys
fees is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523;
B.

Order Frederic W einschenk to pay the cost o f this action; and

C.

Grant the Plaintiff such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

G. STEVEN ROWE
ATTORNEY GENERAL

DATED:

February 3, 2004

/s/ Linda J. Conti____________________
LINDA J. CONTI
Assistant Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, M aine 04333-0006
Tel. (207) 626-8591
Attorneys for State o f Maine
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Hearing Date: November 10, 2004
Time: 9:45
Location: U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Portland
Obj due: October 10, 2004
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF MAINE

In re
Frederic D. Weinschenk,

)
)
)

Chapter 7
Case No. 02-21455 JBH

)
Debtor

)

___________________________________________ )

State o f Maine,
Plaintiff

)
)

)
)

)
v.

)

)
)
Frederic D. Weinschenk,
Defendant

Adv. Proceeding No. 04-2004

STATE’S MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

)
)

NOW COMES the State o f Maine pursuant to Local Rule 7056-1, District Court Rule 56
and Rule 56 o f the Federal Rules o f Civil Procedure, by and through undersigned counsel, and
moves for Summary Judgment on Count I o f the Complaint for the reasons set forth below.
FACTS
On or about November 6, 2000, the State filed a civil suit against Frederic D.
W einschenk (“W einschenk”) for violations o f the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 207, in connection with his home-building business. P laintiffs Statement o f Material Facts
N ot in D ispute (“PSMF”) 1[ 1. In September 2002, a six-day non-jury trial was held in Kennebec
County Superior Court, PSMF f 2.

On December 23,2002, the Superior Court issued a written Judgment and Order. PSMF f
3. In the Judgment and Order dated December 23,2002, the Superior Court set forth several
factual findings and legal conclusions on which the State relies for purposes o f the instant
summary judgm ent motion. PSMF If 3-28. Those findings are set forth in the following six
paragraphs.
W einschenk has no formal training in engineering or architecture. PSMF If 5. In the
1990s, he set out to build affordable housing in three developments in Portland: Cottage Park,
Summer Place and Willow. PSMF If 6. Weinschenk designed all but one o f the homes in these
three developments. PSMF ^ 7. Most o f the houses are one-of-a-kind custom designs. PSMF ^
8. The houses in Cottage Park, Summer Place and Willow are eye-catching houses with many
intersecting ro o f lines and fixed glass windows adding to the features. PSMF if 9.
In building the homes that he designed in these developments, W einschenk worked on
every detail to eliminate cost and overhead. PSMF 1) 10. His cost-cutting measures included
constructing fixed pane windows him self on the construction site. PSMF if 10. Weinschenk
used cheap building materials in a clever fashion. PSMF if 11. A sa result, some o f the houses
are “under built” in the sense that they lack the quality o f materials and workmanship one would
expect in a house with custom design features and appearance. PSMF if 12.
Not long after the purchasers moved in, many o f the houses developed problems. PSMF
13. Nearly all o f the houses had leaks in both the roofs and in the fixed windows manufactured
on site. PSMF if 14. Ironically, the interesting roof lines and creative use o f glass that make the
houses so attractive are the major sources o f problems. PSMF if 15. The complexity o f the roof
design, as well as the use o f metal roofing and use o f inexperienced workers, left the roofs more
prone to leaks. PSMF if 16.
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The houses, particularly the roofs and windows, are defective and do not comply with
generally accepted building practices. PSMF

17. The leaks in the roofs and windows were not

subtle defects that would require a long time to detect; in most cases the leaks were readily
apparent with the first rainstorm after occupancy. PSMF f 18. The crack in the foundation of
the Novotny home is a prim e example o f W einschenk’s poor workmanship. PSMF f 20.
W einschenk obviously knew about the problems with the houses from complaints he
received, but he did not change his construction practices to avoid similar problems in future
homes. PSMF Tf 19. W einschenk misrepresented to consumers the quality o f the construction o f
the homes. PSMF f 21. The consumers did not understand that using cheap materials in a clever
fashion was a m ajor part o f W einschenk’s market planning and construction practices. PSMF U
22. W einschenk emphasized throughout his advertising and personal contacts with prospective
customers that the homes would be o f good quality. PSMF

23. They had no reason to believe

that they were not getting good quality because W einschenk’s design work tended to mask the
comers that he cut in construction. PSMF

24. The individuals who purchased homes from

W einschenk did not receive the value that they had reason to expect. PSMF ^ 25.
The Superior Court ordered restitution for the defective roofs and windows in the homes
of Dr. Mullen, Nancy and Aaron Tufts, Denise Novotny and Laura Thibodeau1 as follows:

1The Superior Court ordered total restitution of $221,256 payable to nine consumers. The State is only seeking a
determination that the restitution ordered for the benefit of Dr. Mullen, Mr. and Mrs. Tufts, Ms. Novotny and Ms.
Thibodeau is nondischargeable in this adversary proceeding. The State has not sought a determination that the
restitution ordered for the other five consumers is non-dischargeable because those consumers did not purchase thenhomes directly from Ric Weinschenk.
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Dr. Mullen

$22,400

Nancy and Aaron Tufts

$25,550

Denise Novotny

$75,556

Laura Thibodeau

$19,360

PSMF if 26. The restitution amount for the Novotny house includes seriously needed foundation
work. PSMF if 27. The Superior Court held that Ric Weinschenk Builders Inc. acted as
W einschenk’s alter ego, and that both the corporation and Weinschenk were thus jointly and
severally liable for the restitution. PSMF if 28. The Superior Court also ordered Weinschenk to
pay the State’s attorneys fees and costs in the amount o f $69,829.51. PSMF if 32.
By separate Injunction and Order issued on December 23, 2002, the Superior Court
permanently enjoined W einschenk from engaging in unfair and deceptive acts and practices in
the marketing and construction of homes. PSMF if 29. Following a spate o f post-trial motions,
Weinschenk appealed the Superior Court’s Orders, which appeal is still pending in the Law
Court. PSMF ifif 30, 31 and 33.
In addition to the factual findings and legal conclusions set forth by the Superior Court,
the State also relies on evidence adduced at trial on the facts set forth in the following seven
paragraphs.
Weinschenk knew about problems with the homes no later than 1995. Ms. Claire Ross
moved into her Weinschenk home in October 1994. PSMF iff[ 35-38. She experienced
significant problems with the house within the first year she lived in it. PSMF ifif 38, 39 and 41.
She notified Weinschenk o f the problems when they occurred. PSMF if 40. Ms. Ross
subsequently reached a formal settlement agreement with Weinschenk for undisclosed terms.
PSMF if 42.
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Dr. John Mullen had recently moved to Maine and rented for a year before looking for a
place to buy. PSMF if 44. In the spring o f 1995, Dr. Mullen m et with Weinschenk’s realtor, Jim
McFarlane. PSMF if 45. McFarlane told Dr. Mullen that Summer Place would have views of
Casco Bay and he gave him some favorable references for Weinschenk. PSMF il 46-48. Dr.
Mullen met with W einschenk and McFarlane to discuss the location o f his lot and the design o f
his house. PSMF if 49. Dr. Mullen executed a contract with Weinschenk for the land and the
construction o f the house in July 1995, and construction began in September o f that year. PSMF
if 52. The contract documents provided that the house would be o f good quality and free from
defects. PSMF i| 54. The contract price was about $200,000. PSMF ^53.
Dr. M ullen moved into the house in January 1996. PSMF if 56. Within one month a pipe
froze and burst due to lack of insulation causing water damage. PSMF

57. The ro o f leaked for

the first time in M arch and April o f 1996. PSMF if 59. On both o f these occasions, Dr. Mullen
notified W einschenk o f the problems. PSMF iflf 58 and 60.
Nancy and Aaron Tufts purchased a lot in Summer Place in 1995. PSMF if 62. At their
request, construction was not to begin on their house until 1997. PSMF if 62. Weinschenk
helped them select a lot in the Summer Place development that would accommodate a swimming
pool. PSMF ^ 63. Weinschenk asked them to come up with a wish list o f features they would
want in a house, such as a warm, welcoming exterior, how many bedrooms, and how many
bathrooms. PSMF if 64. Mrs. Tufts had many conversations with Weinschenk before he
designed the house. PSMF if 65. During one o f these conversations, he gave her a brochure that
described Summer Place as offering “Quality and Value.” PSMF if 66-67. Based upon the
discussion and the brochure, Mrs. Tufts believed that Weinschenk was building her a high-end
custom-designed house. PSMF ifif 67-68. Weinschenk told her that the quality o f his
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construction was superior. PSMF ]f 69. Weinschenk discussed cost with Mrs. Tufts later in the
construction process, but those discussions centered on design not quality. PSMF

74.

The Tufts paid $45,000 for the lot and an additional $156,000 for the construction o f the
house, plus $5,000 to $7,000 for change orders. PSM F

71-73. Construction began in April

1997 and the Tufts moved into their home in October o f that year. PSMF Tf 75-76. Within a
month the roof leaked. PSMF f 77. The windows also leaked shortly thereafter. PSMF ^ 78.
Denise Novotny and Stephen Monn entered into a construction contract with Weinschenk
to build a home in Summer Place in May 1997. PSM F | 84. Both W einschenk and realtor Jim
McFarlane told Ms. Novotny that her house would be o f the finest quality. PSMF ^ 80. The
construction contracts provide that the “[w]ork will be o f good quality, free from faults and
defects.” PSMF ]f 85. The contract specifications also provided that the concrete foundation
would be “true, square, and plumb within the standards o f the trade.” PSMF

87. Novotny and

Monn paid $75,000 for the lot, $165,700 for the house, and $7,000 for the driveway. PSMF
83. Construction o f the home began in September or October o f 1997. PSMF If 88.
During construction o f the home Ms. Novotny noticed a leak in the lower bedroom.
Weinschenk told her not to worry; it would be taken care of. PSMF

89. A t the time o f the

State court trial in September 2002, the leak was still there. PSMF

90. Ms. Novotny moved

into the house in February 1998. PSMF 1 91. At the time o f the trial Ms. Novotny had a leak in
the great room, the same leak in the downstairs bedroom and a leak behind her electrical panel.
PSMF ^ 92. She also had a large crack in her foundation that runs from one end o f the house to
the other. She testified that she first noticed this crack about two and one-half years before the
trial. PSMF If 93.
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Laura Thibodeau lives in the Willow development in a home designed and constructed by
Weinschenk. PSMF

94-95. Ms. Thibodeau first met W einschenkin June or July o f 1998

when he gave her a tour o f a spec house in the W illow Development. PSMF f 96. He told her
that the home would be built correctly, with good workmanship and sound construction. PSMF
98. The initial price for her house was $ 155,000. This price changed somewhat due to
change orders that she requested. PSMF ]f 99. Ms. Thibodeau’s contract with Weinschenk
provides that the “ [w]ork will be o f good quality free from faults and defects.” PSMF

100.

Ms. Thibodeau moved into the house the week after Christmas 1998. PSMF f 101. Since that
time she has experienced severe roof leaks. PSMF

102.

The State o f M aine filed this Adversary Complaint in Weinschenk’s pending Chapter 7
Bankruptcy case alleging that a portion o f the restitution and costs awarded to the State by the
Superior Court is nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (Count I), and 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (Count II). The State seeks summary judgment on Count I o f the Complaint.
ARGUMENT
A.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56 (made applicable to this proceeding by Bankruptcy Rule 7056-1). Turner v. Phoenix

Fin. LLC (In re Imageset, Inc.), 299 B.R. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Me. 2003).
B.

Collateral Estoppel Effect o f State Court Judgment
Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation o f an issue once it has been “determined by a

valid and final judgm ent.” Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Collateral estoppel
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principles apply in bankruptcy proceedings to determine the dischargeability o f a debt pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Grogan v. Gamer, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991). In Grogan, the Supreme
Court held that a Bankruptcy Court could properly give collateral estoppel effect to those
elements o f the claim that are identical to the elements required for discharge and that were
actually litigated and determined in the prior action. Id. at 285-287. To preclude relitigation, the
State court judgment relied upon must demonstrate a violation o f the respective Section 523(a)
elements. See Staniunas v. Delisle (In re Delisle) 281 B.R. 457, 463 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)
(holding that a party seeking to except the debt from discharge bears the burden o f proving each
element o f the exception by a preponderance o f evidence).
To determine the preclusive effect o f a prior State court judgment, the Bankruptcy Court
looks to that State’s collateral estoppel law. In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2001). In
Maine, collateral estoppel bars the assertion o f an issue o f fact that was actually litigated on the
merits and determined by a valid final judgment in a prior action if the issue was essential to the
judgment. Sargent v. Buckley, 1997 ME 159,

6, 697 A.2d 1272. Both the Court o f Appeals for

the First Circuit and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court have held that a State court judgment is
final for collateral estoppel purposes despite an appeal therefrom. In re Mitchell E. Kane, 254 F.
3d 325, 328 (1st Cir. 2001); Bartlett v. Pullen, 586 A. 2d 1263,1265 (Me. 1991). See also In re

Tapper 123 B.R. 594, 602 (Bankr. N. D. HI. 1991) (applying Illinois law in similar
circumstances).
To determine whether the elements o f collateral estoppel have been satisfied in a
dischargeability proceeding, “the bankruptcy court should look at the entire record o f the state
proceeding, not just the judgm ent.” In re Tapper, 123 B.R. 594, 600 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1991).
Here the Bankruptcy Court has the full State court record before it. The State court trial record
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presented here demonstrates that the factual issues that were actually litigated in the State court
and that were essential to the portion of the restitution order relating to Dr. Mullen, Mr. and Mrs.
Tufts, Ms. Novotny and Ms. Thibodeau are identical to the factual issues that need to be resolved
in a nondischargeability determination under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A). Therefore, to the extent
necessary, this Court m ay look to the evidence adduced at trial and apply collateral estoppel and
the doctrine o f issue preclusion to those facts for the purpose o f determining nondischargeability
o f the Defendant’s debt. Id.
C.

Restitution Awarded Under the State Court Judgment Is Nondischargeable
In cases involving the Attorney General’s enforcement o f State consumer protection

statutes, bankruptcy courts have found that facts supporting State restitution orders also support
the standard o f nondischargeability under Section 523(a)(2)(A). In re Edwards, 233 B.R. 461,
477 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1999); In reFravel, 143 B.R. 1001, 1014-1015 (E.D. Va. 1992); In re

Tapper, 123 B.R. 594, 600-601 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1991); and In re Taite, 76 B.R. 764, 773
(Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1987).2
D.

The Defendant’s Fraudulent Conduct Resulted In a Nondischargeable Debt.
To establish that a debt is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(A), a creditor must

establish the following five factors by a preponderance o f the evidence: (1) the Debtor
knowingly made a false representation or made one in reckless disregard o f the truth; (2) the
Debtor intended to deceive; (3) the Debtor intended to induce the creditors to rely upon the false
statement; (4) the creditor actually relied upon the misrepresentation; (5) the creditor’s reliance

2In In re Edwards and In re Favel, the Attorney General’s consumer protection case was tried before the
Bankruptcy Court. In In re Tapper and In re Taite, as in this case, the actions were tried before a State court whose
findings were given collateral estoppel effect by the Bankruptcy Court. In all four cases, the Bankruptcy Court found
that restitution awarded for the benefit of consumers in consumer protection actions bought by the State was
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).
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was justifiable; and (6) the creditor’s reliance upon the false statement caused damage. In re

Delisle, 281 B.R. at 463; Palmacci v. Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781,786 (1st Cir. 1997).
To establish a violation o f the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Attorney General
m ust establish that an act is unfair or deceptive and occurs in trade or commerce. 5 M.R.S.A. §
207. Before bringing an action to enforce the Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, the Attorney
General must determine that such proceedings would be in the public interest. 5 M.R.S.A. § 209.
W hile the dischargeability standard under Section 523(a)(2)(A) mirrors the requirements for
proof o f common law fraud, a violation o f the Act is not the same as the commission o f common
law fraud. The A ct affords broader consumer protection than does common law fraud.
Nevertheless, an examination o f the State court trial record in this case shows that the factual
issues that were actually litigated and that were essential to the State court judgment are identical
to the factual issues that need to be resolved in a nondischargeability determination under section
523(a)(2)(A).
1. Weinschenk Knowingly Made False Statements.
W ith regard to the first element, false representation, the First Circuit has relied on the
Restatement: “the concept o f misrepresentation includes a false representation as to one’s
intention, such as a promise to act. ‘A representation o f the m aker’s own intention to do ... a
particular thing is fraudulent i f he does not have that intention’ at the time he makes the
representation.” Palmacci, 121 F.3d at 786 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 530(1)).
The court went on to explain:
The test m ay be stated as follows. If, at the time he made his promise,
the debtor did not intend to perform, then he has made a false
representation (false as to his intent) and the debt that arose as a result
thereof is not dischargeable (if the other elements o f § 523(a)(2)(A)
are met). If he did so intend at the time he made his promise, but
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subsequently decided that he could not or would not so perform, then
his initial representation was not false when made.

Id. at 787. Applying that standard to the instant case, W einschenk made statements to Dr.
Mullen, Mrs. Tufts, Ms. Novotny and Ms. Thibodeau about the quality o f the construction o f
their homes that he knew were false. He told Mrs. Tufts that the quality o f his construction was
superior. PSMF ^ 69. He told Ms. Novotny that it would be o f the finest quality. PSMF

80.

He told Ms. Thibodeau that her house would be built with good quality and sound construction.
PSMF 198.
Weinschenk made these statements while meeting with the homeowners individually to
custom design their homes. PSMF If 49, 68, 80, and 77-98. In addition, Jim McFarlane, a realtor
employed by Weinschenk, made statements to some o f the homeowners. He gave Dr. Mullen,
who asked him for references for Weinschenk, some favorable references. PSMF Iff 45-49. He
also told Ms. Novotny her home would be a fine quality home. PSMF if 80. Pursuant to
principles o f agency law, McFarlane’s statements as to W einschenk’s abilities must be attributed
to Weinschenk for purposes o f section 523(a)(2)(A) nondischargeability analysis. In re Moon,
1997 Bankr. LEXIS 2346*28-29 (Bankr. E. D. Va. Dec. 12, 1997). In addition to these oral
misrepresentations, W einschenk’s contracts also made representations in the contracts that the
houses would be of good quality and free from defects. PSMF iflf 52, 54-55, 85-87 and 100.
At the time these statements about the quality o f the houses were made, Weinschenk did
not intend to build a fine quality house. PSMF f 10-12. He intended to build an eye-catching
design in a cheap fashion. PSMF fflf 9 and 24. W einschenk intended to build them cheaply and
to cut comers in the construction. PSMF

10-12. Indeed, cutting comers was a major part o f

W einschenk’s marketing and construction practices, but he did not tell the purchasers that he
would be cutting these comers. PSMF fflf 22-23. Also, at the time that he made representations
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about the fine quality and custom designs o f the houses, he knew that his cost cutting measures
were causing problems. PSMF
2.

19.

W einschenk Intended to Deceive.

The First Circuit referred to the second element as the “scienter element,” which “refers
to a different type o f intent, namely, intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud.” Palmacci, 121 F.
3d at 787. The requirement may be m et in one of several ways:
if the maker o f the representation “(a) knows or believes that the
matter is not as he represents it to be; (b) does not have confidence in
the accuracy o f his representation that he states or implies; or (c)
knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he
states or implies.”

Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) o f Torts § 526). “Scienter exists even if he believes the ‘fact’
is true, if he is aware that he does not in fact possess the certitude that he implies by the manner
in which he makes his representation.” Palmacci, 121 F.3d at 787. A person will be deemed to
have the intent to deceive if he represents a thing to be true when he knew that he only believed
or surmised it to be true. Id. Scienter also can be proved by showing that the false
representation was made recklessly, careless o f whether it is true or false. Id. Courts have
recognized that direct proof o f fraudulent intent is nearly impossible to produce and therefore it
m ay be proved the evidence o f the surrounding circumstances from which intent may be
inferred. In re Fravel, 143 B.R. 1001, 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
W einschenk did not have a basis to state that the houses would be built o f good, fine or
superior quality because he knew he was using cheap materials and cutting comers. PSMF fflj
.' ' 21-23. A t the time he made the representations to the purchasers, he knew that his methods o f
construction were problematic for previous home purchasers. PSMF If 19. Ms. Ross called
W einschenk about problems with her house in July and October o f 1995. PSMF ^ 40. The
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construction o f the Mullen house began in September o f 1995 and was not completed until 1996.
Dr. Mullen experienced problems that were reported to W einschenk in February and March o f
1996. PSMF

58 and 60. The Tufts and Novotny homes were not constructed until 1997 and

the Thibodeau home was built in 1998. PSMF

75, 88, and 101. By the time the last three

houses were built, Weinschenk knew that the quality o f the homes was compromised by his
building practices.
Even if he believed that the houses would be o f good quality in spite o f his cost-cutting
methods of construction, W einschenk’s representations to the home purchasers was reckless. At
the time he sat down to m eet w ith them to discuss custom-building their homes, Weinschenk and
his agent emphasized design features and the quality look and feel o f the homes he built. PSMF
46,49, 64, 66. Weinschenk himself, his agent, and his contract documents all told these
purchasers that their custom homes would be o f high quality, and free o f defects. PSMF

49,

54, 68-70, 80, 82, 85-87, 97-98 and 100. W ith the knowledge he had o f pre-existing leaks and
defects in previous homes he built, Weinschenk was aware that he could not live up to his
promise to provide quality and defect-free homes through continued use o f his cost-cutting
construction methods. W hen the creditor has presented evidence demonstrating the debtor’s
intent to deceive, the debtor cannot overcome the inference through an “unsupported assertion of
honest intent.” In re Fravel, 143 B.R. at 1010. “ [T]he very unreasonableness o f such a belief
m ay be strong evidence that it does not in fact exist.” Palmacci, 121 F.3d at 788.
3.

Weinschenk Intended to Induce Reliance upon False Statements

Though the first two elements necessary to establish an exception from discharge under
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) describe the conduct and scienter required to show fraudulent conduct
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generally, the last four elements require a showing that the alleged nondischargeable claim arose
as a direct result o f the debtor’s fraud. In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2001).
The first o f these reliance elements requires proof that the debtor intended to induce the
creditors to rely upon the false statement. In re Delisle, 281 B.R. at 463. In the instant case, the
record shows that W einschenk intended to induce the purchasers to rely on his
misrepresentations. W einschenk’s emphasis in his advertising and personal contacts with
prospective customers was that the homes would be o f good quality. PSMF f 23. It can be
inferred from the fact that he emphasized good quality that he knew it was important to
consumers. In re Fravel, 143 B.R. at 1010 (intent to deceive can be inferred from knowing or
reckless misrepresentation which the person knows will induce another to rely on). Therefore,
W einschenk made false statements about the quality o f his construction to Dr. Mullen, Mrs.
Tufts, Ms. Novotny and Ms. Thibodeau to induce them to enter into a construction contract.
4.

The Victims Actually Relied upon the Debtor’s Misrepresentations.

The bankruptcy code prevents the discharge o f the debt to the extent that the debt was
“obtained by” deliberately false statements. Lentz v. Spadoni (In re Spadoni), 316 F.3d 56, 58
(1st Cir. 2003). To prove actual reliance, it is sufficient to show that the false statements
contributed to the reliance. Id. In the instant case, the consumers actually relied on
W einschenk’s false representations that he would build them quality homes, free o f defect, when
they signed the construction contracts and paid him to build their homes. PSMF
84-85 and 99-100.
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52-53, 71-73,

5.

The Victims’ Reliance Was Justifiable.

The Supreme Court has held that a section 523(a)(2)(A) claim for fraud requires a
showing of justifiable, not reasonable, reliance. Id. at 32 n.6. The Supreme Court pointed to the
following standard for justifiable reliance:
It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent
to one o f his knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he
has discovered something which should serve as a warning that he is
being deceived, that he is required to make an investigation o f his own.

Field v. Mans, 516, U.S. 59, 71 (1995) (quoting W. Prosser, Law o f Torts § 108, p. 718 (4th ed.
1971)). The consumers’ reliance on W einschenk’s misrepresentations were justified in the
circumstances. He met with them all individually to custom design their respective houses
according to their individual needs. PSMF If 49, 64-66, 82 and 97. These custom designs tended
to mask the comers that had been cut in construction. PSMF Tf 24. Weinschenk consciously
withheld information from the consumers regarding the comers he cut in construction, and that
these cut comers had led to problems. PSMF f 19 and 22. There was nothing that would have
served as a warning to the consumers that they were being deceived. Consumers without any
specialized knowledge o f home-building are justified in believing the representations o f a
professed experienced builder, such as Weinschenk, and regardless o f the low-cost o f the home,
are justified in believing his assertions that their homes would be quality built and without
defect. See State o f Idaho v. Edwards (In re Edwards), 233 B.R. 461, 479 (Bankr. D. Idaho,
1999) (purchasers o f tractors had no reason to suspect that there were buying another brand o f
tractor).
6.

Reliance upon the False Statements Caused Damage

The final element that m ust be proved is that the victim s’ reliance on the
misrepresentations was the cause o f their damages. In re Delisle, 281 B.R. at 463. There must
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be a direct link between the misrepresentations and the resulting damage. Spigel, 260 F.3d at 32
n.7. Proximate cause encompasses two elements, “causation in fact” and “legal causation.” In

re Creta, 271 B.R. 214, 219 (B.A .P.lst Cir. 2002) (citing Restatement (Second) o f Torts §§ 546,
548A). Causation in fact requires that a debtor’s misrepresentations be a “substantial factor in
determining the course o f conduct that results in [the] loss.” Id. It is not necessary that the
consumer’s reliance upon the truth o f the fraudulent misrepresentation be the sole or even the
predominant or decisive factor in influencing his conduct. It is enough that the representation
has been a substantial factor influencing his decision. Id. “Legal causation” requires that a
creditor’s loss “reasonably be expected to result from the reliance.” Id.
Applying these standards to the instant case, there is a direct causal link between
W einschenk’s misrepresentations and the damages suffered by the purchasers o f the homes he
constructed. Weinschenk represented that the homes would be custom homes o f good quality.
PSM F

23, 24, 55, 68, 69, 80, 85, 98 and 100. The consumers’ reliance on the truth o f these

statements was a substantial factor in influencing their decisions to enter into their contracts.
W einschenk’s professed ability and willingness to deliver a home o f good quality, free from
defects, went to the “very essence o f the agreement, i.e., the reliance by the contracting party that
the debtor has the requisite knowledge, experience, and training to properly complete the work.”

In re Creta, 271 B.R. at 220.
“ [W]here the misrepresentation goes to the essence o f the contract, the bankruptcy court
should not permit a debtor to benefit from the uncertainty that m ay arise in the very
circumstances which the fraudulent misrepresentation was created.” Id. at 221. In this case
W einschenk made misrepresentations concerning the quality o f the homes, the
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misrepresentations went to the essence o f the contract, and the work he performed was defective.
This is sufficient to establish causation in fact.
There is also legal causation. The damages to the consumers could reasonably have been
expected to result from the consumers’ reliance on W einschenk’s misrepresentations. In other
words, the loss was foreseeable. Id. at 221-22. Weinschenk told the prospective purchasers that
he would custom design and build them quality homes, free o f defects. PSMF Iff 23, 50, 54, 6869, 80, 82, 85-87,97-98 and 100. H e did not tell them that he used lower quality materials and
cut comers on construction techniques. PSMF f f 19, 22 and 24. It was foreseeable that the
consumers would rely on these misrepresentations in signing the contracts with Weinschenk, and
that defective w ork that was done on the homes would result in the losses that occurred.
The State court’s findings and the evidence adduced at the trial demonstrate that the State
court’s judgm ent against W einschenk awarding restitution to Dr. Mullen, Mrs. Tufts, Ms.
Novotny and Ms. Thibodeau falls w ithin the exception from discharge, meeting all elements o f
“false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud” required by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
W einschenk fraudulently induced Mullen, Tufts, Novotny and Thibodeau each to enter a
construction contract. Dr. Mullen paid about $200,000, as did the Tufts. PSMF f f 53, 71-73.
Ms. Novotny paid about $247,700 and Laura Thibodeau paid $155,000. PSMF f f 83 and 99.
The Superior Court found that W einschenk owes restitution related to the cost o f replacing
defective roofs and windows as follows: $22, 400 for Dr. Mullen; $25,500 for the Tufts; $75,556
for Ms. Novotny; and $19, 360 for Ms. Thibodeau. PSMF f 26. The Novotny restitution
includes the cost o f repairing the defective foundation. PSMF f 27. The Superior Court’s
restitution award as it relates to Dr. Mullen, Mrs. Tufts, Ms. Novotny and Ms. Thibodeau is a
debt that is related to W einschenk’s fraud and is therefore nondischargeable. Cohen v. de la
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Cruz, 523 U.S.213, 221 (1998) (section 523(a)(2)(A) bars the discharge of all liability arising
from fraud).
E.

Costs Awarded in State Court Judgment Are Nondischargeable
The Supreme Court has held that once it is established that a debt has been incurred

through fraud, “any debt” arising therefrom is excepted from discharge. Cohen v. De La Cruz,
523 U.S. 213, 223 (1998). This exception includes attorney fees and costs relating to obtaining a
judgm ent o f false pretenses or fraud. Id. at 223.
In the State court case the Superior Court awarded total restitution o f $221,256 and total
attorney fees and costs o f $69,829.41. PSMF Tflf 3 and 32. In this adversary proceeding, the
State seeks a determination that $142,866 of the restitution ordered by the Superior Court is
nondischargeable. It follows then, under the exception to dischargeability, that amounts
expended by the State in obtaining the $ 142,866 are also nondischargeable. To determine the
amount o f fees and costs that are nondischargeable, the State reviewed its affidavit o f fees and
costs submitted in the Superior Court. The State eliminated from its request for fees any
amounts attributable solely to the secondary purchasers who are not included in this adversary
complaint. The State recalculated its costs and fees and arrived at $63,888.24. PSMF Tf 103.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the State o f Maine respectfully requests that the Court
enter summary judgment in its favor on Count I o f the Complaint and find that the restitution
amounts o f $22,400 for Dr. Mullen, $25,550 for Mr. and Mrs. Tufts, $19,360 for Ms. Thibodeau
and $75,556 for Ms. Novotny, as well as the State’s attorney fees and costs o f $63,888.24, are
nondischargeable.
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